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 Flipping the Script on Brady 
ION MEYN* 
Brady v. Maryland imposes a disclosure obligation on the prosecutor and, for this 
reason, is understood to burden the prosecutor. This Article asks whether Brady also 
benefits the prosecutor, and if so, how and to what extent does it accomplish this?  
This Article first considers Brady’s structural impact—how the case influenced 
broader dynamics of litigation. Before Brady, legislative reform transformed civil 
and criminal litigation by providing pretrial information to civil defendants but not 
to criminal defendants. Did this disparate treatment comport with due process? 
Brady arguably answered this question by brokering a compromise: in exchange for 
imposing minor obligations on the prosecutor at trial, the Court signaled to the 
prosecutor that to withhold information before trial does not violate due process.  
This Article also explores Brady’s narrative treatment. This Article contends that 
the narrative that Brady imposes a significant burden on prosecutors, despite 
scholarly efforts to move past it, is pervasive. This narrative of prosecutorial burden 
confers unearned legitimacy to case outcomes. This Article finally examines how 
prosecutorial interests have deployed Brady politically, focusing on how the 
Department of Justice has wielded the Brady obligation to deflect political attempts 
to expand pretrial discovery.  
In the attempt to provide a fuller account of the case’s benefits and burdens on 
litigants, this Article suggests the possibility that Brady can also be viewed as a 
prosecutorial ally. This Article uses this possibility as an opportunity to consider 
alternative approaches to assessing whether the criminal pretrial procedural regime 
comports with due process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Brady v. Maryland, a landmark case in the criminal procedure canon, will confound 
those who attempt to frame it. The case’s command—that a prosecutor must turn 
over material information favorable to a defendant1—has left a legacy of 
contestation. Some celebrate the case for announcing a bold vision of due process.2 
Others lament that a conservative doctrinal countermand dashed any potential.3 
 
 
 1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 2. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE THOMAS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, 
AND PERSPECTIVES 892 (5th ed. 2013) (“The Court’s first constitutional discovery case was a 
‘shot heard ‘round the world.’”); RUSSELL L. WEAVER, LESLIE W. ABRAMSOM, RONALD 
BACIGAL, JOHN M. BURKOFF, CATHERINE HANCOCK, DONALD E. LIVELY & JANET C. HOEFFEL, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES: PROBLEMS & EXERCISES 888 (3d ed. 2007) (“Brady’s due 
process obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence overrides any limitations on discovery 
provided for by a jurisdiction’s discovery statutes or rules.”). Justice Marshall would assert the 
“original theory and promise of Brady” was to be as broad as the duty of the prosecutor to 
disclose all evidence in his files that “might reasonably be considered favorable” to the 
defendant’s case. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 702 (1985).  
 3. Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 686 
(2006) (“Reflecting on this landmark decision forty-three years later, one is struck by the 
dissonance between Brady’s grand expectations to civilize U.S. criminal justice and the grim 
reality of its largely unfulfilled promise.”); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1535–36 (2010) (arguing that subsequent Brady decisions have 
failed to live up to the ideals of the original decision); Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: 
The Role of Precedent in the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
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Almost all commentators perceive the case as a benefit to the defendant and a burden 
to the prosecutor. But might Brady also confer certain benefits to prosecutors? This 
Article recasts Brady as a potential prosecutorial ally in important respects, raising 
new questions over the doctrine’s ability to ensure due process in criminal disputes.  
One benefit that Brady conferred to prosecutors is structural in nature. Under 
common law, civil and criminal disputes shared a similar procedural template. 
Before Brady was decided, a federal effort was launched to reform civil litigation.4 
The transformative result simplified pleading, permitted joinder of claims, and 
created a pretrial discovery phase.5 The federal reform effort then took up criminal 
litigation with a proposal that mirrored the civil template.6 But the final draft did not 
include pretrial discovery for criminal disputes. Did a system that afforded pretrial 
information to civil defendants, but not to criminal defendants, comport with due 
process?  
This Article argues that Brady implicitly resolved this question. By constraining 
due process review to the trial moment, Brady fortified prosecutorial power over the 
distribution of information during pretrial proceedings, where virtually all cases 
(ninety-five percent) resolve.7 As to the five percent of criminal cases that advance 
to trial, defendants in those cases have no constitutional right to any pretrial 
disclosures—however essential such information might be to preparing for trial. In 
carving out an unused space (trial) to constitutionally insist on prosecutorial 
disclosure, the Court signaled that the pretrial record was free from constitutional 
scrutiny. Under this view, Brady can be understood to have validated the larger 
procedural project in the late 1930s and early 1940s to reform litigation, a 
restructuring that significantly favored prosecutorial interests. 
Another benefit that Brady confers to prosecutorial interests is narrative. 
Narratives generated in law school curriculum, scholarship, and popular accounts 
portray Brady to impose on the prosecutor a duty to do damage to her own case.8 
 
 
77 (2012). 
 4. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 961 (1987). 
 5. Id. at 923–34. 
 6. Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal Procedure Are So Different: A Forgotten History, 
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 706–07 (2017). 
 7. See RICK JONES, GERALD B. LEFCOURT, BARRY J. POLLACK, NORMAN L. REIMER & 
KYLE O’DOWD, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL AND HOW TO SAVE IT 14, 62 n.2 (2018), https://www.nacdl.org 
/getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-520b3f58036a/the-trial-penalty-the-sixth-amendme 
nt-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinction-and-how-to-save-it.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DCC-
W6PJ] (finding that approximately ninety-seven percent of federal criminal cases are resolved 
before trial); Erica Goode, Stronger Hands for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-
after-rulings-on-plea-deals.html [https://perma.cc/2Z55-NGBW] (reporting that “97 percent 
of federal cases and 94 percent of state cases end in plea bargains”).   
 8. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale 
of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 643–44 (2002) (“Brady is often heralded 
as the Supreme Court case that granted the criminally accused a constitutional right to 
discovery. . . . Certainly when I first started teaching Brady, I taught it from this heroic 
viewpoint.”). 
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Portraying Brady as requiring a self-inflicted wound enhances the image of the 
prosecutor as a minister of justice who searches for the truth, and not for any 
particular result. This portrayal helps conceal the reality that the prosecutor has 
license to engage in truth-suppressing tactics during the pretrial period. Often 
portrayed as a game-changing doctrine that reflects a special concern for due process 
in the criminal arena, an inflated narrative distributes significant benefits to 
prosecutorial interests in conferring legitimacy, however unearned, to outcomes.  
This Article also examines a political use of the case that has furthered 
prosecutorial interests. In individual cases, prosecutors will always argue Brady is 
limited to trial, and the Court has agreed. Despite this agreement that Brady does not 
apply to pretrial proceedings, in the political arena, prosecutorial interests have 
argued that the Brady burden should protect them against legislative efforts to expand 
pretrial discovery. In this way, prosecutors not only have relied on Brady to limit the 
constitutional review of information to the trial phase but have effectively deployed 
Brady to beat back legislative proposals to expand pretrial discovery. 
In identifying how Brady has potentially distributed benefits to prosecutorial 
interests, this Article is situated within scholarship that questions how rights, within 
political and social contexts, can work to reinforce entrenched power.9 In providing 
a lens to understand Brady not just as a check on executive power but also as a 
doctrine of executive empowerment, this Article questions prevailing explanations 
of Brady’s role in criminal disputes, and it further questions whether the Court’s 
present approach adequately addresses process concerns in criminal disputes.  
In Part I, this Article turns to Brady’s origin story, examining its doctrinal roots 
and how the legal community initially received the case. This Part also seeks to 
situate Brady within the political context: the case followed political reform that 
dramatically altered litigation and increased prosecutorial power. Part II considers 
the structural, narrative, and political implications of Brady that potentially distribute 
benefits to prosecutorial interests. Part III uses the possibility that Brady is a 
prosecutorial ally to consider alternative approaches to assessing whether the 
criminal pretrial procedural regime comports with due process. 
I. BRADY, A MODEST DOCTRINE, A MOMENTOUS IMPACT 
Decided in 1963, Brady announced a prosecutor must disclose evidence 
“favorable” to the defendant and “material” to the case.10 Brady is considered a 
landmark due process case. Brady’s vague language is subject to contestation, though 
 
 
 9. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (1999); RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
(2007); Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: 
The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1425–26 (2016); Lani Guinier, 
From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Divergence Dilemma 91 J. AM. HIST. 1 (2006); Alice Ristroph, Power-Conferring Criminal 
Procedure (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (revealing how a 
constitutional right has a power-conferring nature—that is, in creating a zone of regulation, 
the Court facilitates the exercise of state power within these constraints). 
 10. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
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much of the debate surrounding Brady’s meaning and importance is of a recent 
vintage. As post-conviction litigation took on new significance with a growing 
innocence movement, Brady’s visibility increased, as did scrutiny.11 Some viewed 
Brady’s disclosure obligations to be significant, early enough, and readily enforced 
by prosecutors exercising their role as ministers of justice.12 Others identified 
features of Brady that diluted its effectiveness.13 However disparate these voices are 
in assessing Brady, there is widespread agreement that the doctrine was designed to 
burden the prosecutor. Left undertheorized is the consideration that Brady also 
operated to benefit prosecutorial interests. To examine this possibility, it is beneficial 
to step away from the current debates and to consider Brady’s origin story.  
A. Brady at Birth, a Modest Proposition 
Initially, Brady received a quiet reception. The legal community viewed the case 
as a minor adjustment to existing rules of trial engagement. Bar journals referenced 
Brady a few times, accompanied by an obligatory summation.14  
For contrast, the legal ecosystem’s reaction to Gideon v. Wainwright, decided that 
same year, filled bar journal pages.15 As the legal community absorbed a new 
paradigm of practice under Gideon, any significance of Brady escaped notice. The 
following year, Gideon often served as a publication’s centerpiece: “The Year of 
 
 
 11. The references to “Brady v. Maryland” begin to grow in the mid-1970s, and 
exponentially in the early 2000s. See Timeline Graph, LEXISNEXIS, https://advance.lexis.com/ 
(searching “Brady v. Maryland”). 
 12. See, e.g., Kelly A. Zusman & Daniel Gillogly, Getting a Clue: How Materiality 
Continues to Play a Critical Role in Guiding Prosecutors’ Discovery Obligations, 60 U.S. 
ATT’Y BULL. 5, 13–20 (2012) (referring to some Brady disclosure requirements as “self-
executing” and arguing that the broad view of materiality at the pretrial stage used by some 
trial court judges “does not reflect the constitutional rule”). 
 13. See infra notes 110–114 and accompanying text. 
 14. A search on Hein Online for “‘brady maryland’~4” calls up two bar journals in 1963; 
the same search for Gideon resulted in seventy-seven references. In 1963–64, scholarship 
addressing Brady only provided a quick, accessible summary of the holding. See, e.g., Carolyn 
Jaffe Andrew, Abstracts of Recent Cases, 54 J. CRIM L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.  488, 493 
(1963); Notes, Contracts—Minor’s Contract—An Absolute or Relative Nullity?, 38 TUL. L. 
REV. 755, 760–63 (1964); George Rossman & Rowland L. Young, Review of Recent Supreme 
Court Decisions, 49 A.B.A. J.  895, 899 (1963). But c.f. Richard A. Bradshaw, Comment, 
Discovery in Criminal Cases: The Problem in Texas, 1 HOUS. L. REV. 158, 162 nn.30–31 
(1963); John C. Tyson, III, Whither: On Habeus, 24 ALA. LAW. 271 (1963). 
 15. Examples of Gideon’s uptake abound. In Missouri, “[L]eaders of the Bar [now] 
realize that further progress must be made in providing counsel for indigents. Roy Swanson, 
Report of President Roy P. Swanson, 19 J. MO. B., 592, 593–94 (1963); see also Edward 
Thorton, Sections for the Alabama Bar Association, 24 ALA. LAW. 335, 336, 341 (1963). In 
New York, Gideon is a “significant achievement.” Lawyers Guide to Current Thought as 
Culled from the Periodicals, 21 B. BULL. N.Y. 146, 150 (1963). In North Carolina (where 
state-rights adherents bristled at federal incursion), the state deputy attorney general wrote: “I 
apologize to you for again mentioning this much discussed subject. Now that the Supreme 
Court of the United States has begun its process of legislation . . . the next question is: What 
is the probable extent of this Act now that it has passed?” Honorable Ralph Moody, Probable 
Extent of Assignment of Counsel of Indigent Defendants, N.C. ST. B. Q., Nov. 1963, at 21, 22.   
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Gideon,” announced the Kentucky State Bar Journal;16 “The Gideon Case, A 
Mandate for the Organized Bar,” stated the Boston Bar Journal;17 “The Impact of 
Gideon v. Wainwright,” announced the Pennsylvania Bar Association Magazine.18 
Having a similar period of time to reflect over Brady’s potential import, the legal 
community remained silent—though a bar journal did take up discussion on Brady 
in 1964 for its possible contribution to understanding an arcane civil-procedure point 
about the Erie Doctrine.19  
The muted reaction was understandable. The opinion traveled well-tread 
precedent, the majority viewing the decision as “an extension” of Mooney v. 
Holohan.20 Decided in 1935, Mooney stood for the proposition that due process was 
offended if a prosecutor presented trial testimony “known to be perjured.”21 Like 
Mooney, Brady regulated the quality of information heard by a jury: if Mooney 
governed what evidence could not be presented at trial (perjured evidence), Brady 
governed what evidence had to be disclosed at trial (material and exculpatory 
evidence).22 A few months after Brady, the Third Circuit granted a new trial where a 
prosecutor withheld a witness statement that the murder victim had aggressed toward 
defendant,23 and the Second Circuit ordered a new trial where the prosecutor failed 
to disclose eyewitnesses who contradicted the State’s case.24 These cases reveal 
Brady’s provision of a remedy where Mooney did not—at issue was not what the 
prosecutor did disclose, but what information the prosecutor failed to disclose. 
Highlighting Brady’s low profile, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1966 stated, 
as to prosecutorial duties of disclosure, the “leading case is Mooney v. Holohan.”25 
A broad review of cases in the five years following Brady’s arrival indicates Brady 
did not disrupt business as usual.26  
 
 
 16. Arnold Trebach, The Year of Gideon, 28 KY. ST. B.J. 37 (1964). 
 17. Frederick Norton, The Gideon Case: A Mandate for the Organized Bar, 8 BOS. B.J. 7 
(1964). 
 18. Richard Thornburg, Indigents in the Pennsylvania Criminal Courts: The Impact of 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 36 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 59 (1964).  
 19. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964), reprinted in 19 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 64 (1964). 
 20. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 
111–12 (1935)). 
 21. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 111–12. Mooney was not only modest in ambition but was in 
operation unenforceable (even if one could prove a witness perjured himself, the prosecutor 
could deny knowledge of the perjury).  
 22. Other cases are often cited on the path from Mooney to Brady: in Pyle v. Kansas, 317 
U.S. 213, 215–16 (1942), the Court suggested a due process violation if a prosecutor 
suppressed evidence favorable to defendant, though the ruling was based on the State 
presenting perjured testimony; in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), the Court held 
that a prosecutor offends due process where he fails to correct false evidence. 
 23. United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622, 625 (3d Cir. 1963). 
 24. United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 1964).  
 25. Commonwealth v. Heffernan, 213 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Mass. 1966) (citation omitted). 
 26. Searches of Hein Online for “Brady v. Maryland” from 1963–73 reveal few mentions 
of the case in bar journals (forty-five) or American Bar Association journals (twenty-one). 
Many of the mentions were syllabi of the case, informing readers of the facts, issue, and 
outcome. See, e.g., Rossman & Young, supra note 14. Several more relate to antitrust 
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The early consensus among federal and state courts was that trial triggered Brady 
and that the constitutional regulation of information did not extend to the pretrial 
period. One such decision even held a prosecutor need not consider a Brady 
disclosure until the “government has closed its case in chief.”27 Courts deemed the 
pretrial space off limits to defendants who attempted to use Brady as a pretrial 
discovery right.28 On this point, a district court in United States v. Manhattan Brush 
Co. was emphatic, a subheading in its order stating, “The Principles of Fair Play in 
the Conduct of a Criminal Prosecution Do Not Supply Defendants with a Basis for 
Pre-Trial Discovery.”29 The court continued that the defendant’s position was 
“predicated on the alleged right of the defense to learn all the Government’s evidence 
in advance of trial. . . . [But in Brady] [t]he entire discussion of the Court related to 
the resulting deception upon the Court and jury.”30 The court observed that pretrial 
discovery was governed by legislative rules, not court-superintended constitutional 
review.31 Similarly, an Alabama decision declining to provide relief under Brady 
referred the defendant to the state’s legislative rules for guidance on pretrial 
discovery rights.32 In Iowa, a defendant’s assertion that Brady entitled him to pretrial 
depositions, so as to permit effective cross-examination at trial, was rejected as an 
attempt to transform Brady into a “right of discovery.”33 A Floridian defendant 
attempting to deploy Brady as a tool to compel pretrial discovery was similarly 
rejected.34 A Wisconsin court, rejecting a Brady claim, added that any pretrial right 
to information would need to be found in state law, since Wisconsin “[did] not 
recognize a right in defendant to a pretrial discovery of the prosecution’s evidence.”35 
The Missouri Supreme Court, in 1967, found nothing in Brady to permit a defendant 
“prior to trial to inspect all evidence in the hands of the prosecution favorable to the 
accused.”36  
 
 
litigation. See, e.g., Charles D. Mahaffie, Jr., Criminal Antitrust Investigations, 41 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 521, 521–26 (1971). In the five years post-Brady, only forty-five federal cases and sixty-
five state cases mention Brady v. Maryland. The references to Brady begin to grow in the mid-
1970s, and exponentially in the early 2000s. See supra note 11. 
 27. United States v. Leighton, 265 F. Supp. 27, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).  
 28. E.g., United States v. Manhattan Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4, 5–6 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); 
Sanders v. State, 179 So. 2d 35, 39 (Ala. 1965) (stating that Brady provides no authority for 
defendant to engage in a “mere fishing expedition”). 
 29. Manhattan Brush, 38 F.R.D. at 5–6. 
 30. Id. at 6. 
 31. See id. at 6–7. 
 32. Sanders, 179 So. 2d at 38–39 (citing L. Drew Redden, The Right of the Defendant to 
Discovery in Criminal Prosecutions, 22 ALA. LAW. 115 (1961)). 
 33. State v. Tharp, 138 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Iowa 1965). 
 34. United States v. Venn, 41 F.R.D. 540, 541 (S.D. Fla. 1966). The Floridian defendant 
attempted to avoid reciprocity (in requesting information, a defendant waives any objection to 
similar information requested by the State) by attempting to use Brady to effectuate a right of 
discovery (presumably without triggering a reciprocity obligation). The court not only viewed 
Brady as “advisory” but also stated that Brady does “not provide additional discovery.” 
 35. State v. Miller, 151 N.W.2d 157, 169 (Wis. 1967). 
 36. State v. Reynolds, 422 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Mo. 1967) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
James M. Carter, Suppression of Evidence Favorable to an Accused, 34 F.R.D. 87, 87 (1964)). 
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During those first years of Brady’s quiet arrival, courts understood Brady to 
provide a modest gap-filling amendment to Mooney—where Mooney barred the 
disclosure of certain evidence by the prosecutor, Brady announced what evidence a 
prosecutor could not withhold at trial.37 Attempts by defendants to expand Brady to 
the pretrial phase were broadly rejected by state and federal courts. Understood as 
imposing a modest burden on the prosecutor, no court or commentator considered 
whether the decision to cede the pretrial process to legislative regulation constituted 
a significant realignment of power that favored prosecutorial interests.  
B. Brady in a Broader Context, a Momentous Impact 
Brady was not decided in a procedural vacuum. In the interim between Mooney 
and Brady, litigation in the United States had been transformed by legislative reform. 
The Court in Brady, however, did not acknowledge the dramatic procedural 
realignment that afforded pretrial information to civil defendants, but not to criminal 
defendants. This Article contends Brady legitimated this new order. Under this view, 
what was understood as a modest adjustment to existing doctrine had implicitly 
validated sweeping legislative reform that granted pretrial discovery to civil 
defendants but denied it to criminal defendants.  
1. The Transformation of Litigation After Mooney 
When the Court decided Mooney in 1935, civil and criminal parties were subject 
to similar treatment.38 Governed by the common law, civil and criminal disputes 
occurred in two stages: pleading and trial.39 Criminal and civil claimants typically 
were constrained to presenting a single issue against a single defendant.40 Pleading 
 
 
 37. Outlier courts detected (however mistakenly) change afoot. E.g., United States v. 
Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (“It seems doubtful, however, that there 
should be a blanket rule postponing to the trial all [Brady] disclosures . . . .”). A district court 
in Indiana, in 1967, noted interplay between the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 
Jencks Act, and Brady, opining that the “Supreme Court today favors broader disclosure in 
criminal cases.” United States v. Westmoreland, 41 F.R.D. 419, 424 (S.D. Ind. 1967). And 
yet, this court found no basis to grant defendant access to a list of government witnesses, 
including eyewitnesses who could not identify defendants. Id. at 427. 
 38. Criminal litigants, for example, would seek instruction from a civil treatise, and vice 
versa. Meyn, supra note 6, at 701–02. 
 39. Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 KAN. L. REV. 350–
52 (2002); see also JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW 
PLEADING 13–14 (1969); BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING 8–9 
(3d ed. 1923). The pleadings stage determined whether a plaintiff had a cognizable claim and, 
if so, endeavored to precisely identify the dispute’s legal and factual topography. See id. at 9; 
Charles E. Clark, History, Systems, and Functions of Pleading, 5 AM. L. SCH. REV. 716, 717 
(1926). 
 40. See, e.g., Stubblefield v. Commonwealth, 246 S.W. 444, 445 (Ky. 1923) (noting that 
the particularities of pleading in criminal law “emanated from the extreme technical exactness 
of the common law with reference to pleading in both civil and criminal causes”); 1 JAMES 
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 508 (1883); Franklin G. 
Fessenden, Improvement in Criminal Pleading, 10 HARV. L. REV. 98, 99 (1896) (“As in ancient 
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was a technically demanding phase, but if litigants made it past judicial scrutiny of 
the claim and defense, they advanced directly to trial. No process empowered parties 
to develop and interrogate a pretrial record. Mooney precluded the prosecutor from 
knowingly presenting perjured evidence at trial,41 as that was when, under common-
law procedure, information was disclosed, developed, and interrogated. 
After Mooney, however, legislative reform transformed litigation. Due to the 
“extreme technical exactness” of pleading in “both civil and criminal causes,”42 
common-law procedure drew criticism from all litigants.43 Within this criticism, the 
New Deal ethos of centralized, expert-based policy interventions provided impetus 
for federal reform.44 Congress enabled the Supreme Court to create the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.45 In creating a new approach to litigation, a civil rules advisory 
committee (appointed by the Court) eased pleading requirements, permitted joinder 
of claims and parties, and installed a pretrial discovery phase—this last part a 
centerpiece, critical to the determination of cases on their merits.46 Civil reform 
balanced competing interests by giving plaintiffs easy access to the courts while 
giving defendants the pretrial opportunity to check the factual integrity of plaintiffs’ 
allegations. Many states adopted the federal template as their own.47  
Following a broadly positive reception, federal reformers took up criminal 
litigation with a proposal that mirrored the civil template.48 Under this proposal, a 
 
 
days the test was whether the case could be brought to fit the writ, so now the inquiry . . . is 
whether the case fits the form of indictment.”). As to single-issue pleading, see Tomlinson v. 
Territory, 33 P. 950, 952 (N.M. 1893) (“There being but one count in the indictment, not more 
than one offense could properly be proved. It is a principle of common law pleading, applicable 
to both civil and criminal cases, that all pleadings must be single.”); THEODORE F. T. 
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 424, 426 (5th ed. 1956) (describing 
pleading requirements as to criminal disputes); Ronald Hamowy, F.A. Hayek and the Common 
Law, 23 CATO J. 241, 248, (2003) (describing pleading requirements as to civil disputes); 
Subrin, supra note 4, at 915. As to the reference to “litigants”—until the professionalization of 
police and the rise of public prosecutors in the late 1800s, it was most common for a private 
citizen to serve as a plaintiff in the criminal law actions. See PLUCKNETT, supra, at 424. 
 41. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1935). 
 42. Stubblefield, 246 S.W. at 445.  
 43. Meyn, supra note 6, at 701–03. 
 44. See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 438 n.2 (2011); 
Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. 
REV. 270, 272–73 (1989); Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1271 (1997). 
 45. 28 U.S.C. § 723(b)–(c) (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018)); Charles 
E. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal Rules I, 15 TENN. L. REV. 551, 
555–56 (1939). The Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
consisting of lawyers, academics, and judges to draft a proposal. Meyn, supra note 6, at 705; 
Subrin, supra note 4, at 971–72. 
 46. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 976–82. 
 47. See Jerold H. Israel, On Recognizing Variations in State Criminal Procedure, 15 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 484–85 (1982). 
 48. Meyn, supra note 6, at 707–10. This approach had academic and political support. Id. 
at 709–10. For example, Jerome Hall, a preeminent criminal procedure scholar, commented: 
“[T]he new civil rules are always suggestive and sometimes can be applied almost literally to 
criminal procedure.” Jerome Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision, 51 
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prosecutor could join issues and easily pass through the courthouse door, but in 
exchange for this privilege, a defendant could require the prosecutor to immediately 
turn over information relevant to the dispute, then test that information through 
depositions. The full Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules (“Criminal 
Committee”), however, produced a significantly modified draft, keeping civil-
joinder and notice-pleading rules but striking discovery provisions.49 As a result of 
these changes, only one party to a criminal dispute has some degree of formalized 
pretrial agency—the prosecutor, who receives information either through the grand 
jury process (which affords the power to compel the disclosure of relevant 
information) or from law enforcement (imbued with the authority to search and 
seize). If civil reform created a finely tuned, hydraulic system intended to reach the 
merits through adversarial testing, criminal reform worsened an already existing 
asymmetry that favored prosecutors.50  
This transformation of civil and criminal litigation occurred after the Court 
decided Mooney but well before the Court decided Brady. When the Court decided 
Brady in 1963, it looked across a transformed procedural plain. The new federal rules 
of procedure had created two separate and unequal worlds—in the civil forum, 
procedural reform constructed a pretrial discovery phase, but in the criminal forum, 
it significantly expanded prosecutorial control over the pretrial period. 
2. The Court in Brady Ignores the Procedural Transfer of Power to the Prosecutor 
The Court ignored these transformative changes when it decided Brady. The 
Court instead looked to Mooney—a case that superintended constitutional notions of 
due process in a world that no longer existed. Following Mooney, the Court 
announced that due process imposed certain obligations on the State at trial. Justice 
White, in Brady’s concurrence, was the most explicit about the line of demarcation, 
writing that the Court left pretrial discovery obligations to the “legislative process 
after full consideration by legislators, bench, and bar.”51 What Justice White failed 
to mention was that many legislatures across the country had already given full 
 
 
YALE L.J. 723, 739 (1942). 
 49. See Meyn, supra note 6, at 727–30. The Committee preserved notice pleading and 
expanded joinder, but discarded discovery, noticed motions, and pretrial influence of courts. 
Id.  
 50. Police power has expanded in terms of staffing, resources, and investigative scope, 
channeling more information to the State’s file. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 
53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 396 (1992). These conditions reinforce police and prosecutorial power. 
Id. Prosecutors have long used the grand jury as an investigative tool. See, e.g., Abraham S. 
Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE 
L.J. 1149, 1191 (1960). 
 51. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 92 (1963) (White, J., concurring). A few scholars 
shared Justice White’s worry that the case would justify unwarranted judicial intervention. See, 
e.g., Robinson O. Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases—In Search of a Standard, 1964 DUKE 
L.J. 477, 515–16 (“For purposes of . . . [a Brady] petition, the defendant . . . will probably make 
allegations in very broad terms . . . and then seek discovery of the documents which were not 
exhibited to the defense . . . .”); David B. Wexler, The Constitutional Disclosure Duty and the 
Jencks Act, 40 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 206, 211 (1966) (stating that Brady represents a 
“constitutional discovery ambit”). 
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consideration to these issues in establishing separate and unequal civil and criminal 
forums, giving form to a new procedural structure that conferred significant benefits 
to prosecutors.  
3. Prosecutorial Power Expands After Brady 
After the Court announced Brady in 1963, a second, more sustained legislative 
period occurred that further increased prosecutorial pretrial discretion. During the 
tough-on-crime movement in the 1970s, the prosecutorial hammer became heavier 
and the radius of its sweep grew wider.52 The Court opted to take on spectator status, 
staying true to the approach first fashioned in 1935 in Mooney, an approach of 
judicial restraint that became more radical as the world around the Court continued 
to change.  
The legislative changes that occurred after Brady were substantive in nature but 
exacerbated the procedural pretrial asymmetry existing between the criminal 
defendant and the prosecutor. These changes are well documented. The 1970s 
marked a hard turn toward crime control, along with a “revolutionary expansion . . . 
in criminal discovery by the prosecution against the defense.”53 As the scope of 
criminally regulated conduct increased,54 more severe sentencing regimes 
proliferated.55 These conditions increased the prosecutor’s “charge bargaining” 
discretion, in which she chooses from a menu of penalties for the same conduct,56 as 
well as her “fact bargaining” discretion, in which a prosecutor determines what facts 
to credit or disregard, providing penalty swings for the same conduct.57 The 
widespread implementation of mandatory minimums—including the Federal 
 
 
 52. Ion Meyn, The Haves of Procedure, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1765, 1798–99 (2019). 
 53. Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance, 
74 CALIF. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1986) (emphasis added). Any discovery gains by defendants in 
the 1960s would encounter a vigorous, sustained, counterresponse. See Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, The Worst Surprise of All: No Right to Pretrial Discovery of the Prosecution’s 
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 253 n.44 (1987); Meyn, supra 
note 52, at 1798–1800; Ellen S. Podger, Criminal Discovery of Jencks Witness Statements: 
Timing Makes a Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 662 nn.71–75 (1999). 
 54. Gershman, supra note 50, at 406 (surveying expansion of the substantive criminal 
law). 
 55. BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 58–61 (2007) (charting 
proliferation of severe sentencing regimes in 1980s and 1990s); Avlana K. Eisenberg, 
Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69 VAND. L. REV. 71, 81–82 (2016) 
(describing effect of tough-on-crime rhetoric that emerged in the 1970s); Carissa Byrne 
Hessick & Douglas A. Berman, Towards a Theory of Mitigation, 96 B.U. L. REV. 161, 169–
70 (2016) (describing how rehabilitation was replaced by retribution in the second half of the 
20th century).  
 56. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 961 (2009); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between 
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 55–59 (1997).  
 57. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2559–60 (2004). Fact bargaining is seen in Bordenkircher v. Hayes: the 
prosecutor threatened to credit a repeat-offender enhancement, transforming a sentence for 
forgery from ten years to life. 434 U.S. 357, 358–59 (1978). 
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Sentencing Guidelines in 1984—transferred discretion from the judiciary to the 
prosecutor, further marginalizing the role of courts in criminal litigation.58 The 
prosecutor’s control over the plea process grew as judges were prevented from 
making downward departures, converting a prosecutor’s presentence offer into the 
sentence itself.59 As reforms in the early 1940s removed the trial court from the front 
end of litigation (it no longer served as a gatekeeper during the pleading stage), 
legislative change after the 1970s removed the judge from the back end of litigation 
(sentencing no longer served as a check on prosecutorial overreaching). 
The Court remained on the sidelines, and the Brady doctrine remained anchored 
to its noninterventionist origins. The Court rebuffed challenges to the trial/pretrial 
line that constrained the scope of its due process review, holding fast to the 
proposition that the prosecutor’s disclosure obligation is triggered by the onset of 
trial.60 The Court has rejected arguments that pretrial proceedings are inextricable 
from the quality of a trial or that a certain indicia of information should inform the 
decision to plea.61 Providing insight into the justification for its commitment to 
nonintervention, in United States v. Bagley, the Court explained its approach was 
careful “not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is 
uncovered.”62 But the Court was more explicit in United States v. Agurs, stating, 
“[w]e are not considering the scope of discovery authorized by the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, or the wisdom of amending those Rules to enlarge the 
defendant’s discovery rights.”63 Only Justice Marshall, in dissent, has challenged the 
pretrial/trial boundary, stating in Bagley that courts gave “too much deference to the 
federal common law policy of discouraging discovery in criminal cases, and too little 
regard to due process of law for defendants.”64 After Marshall’s dissent in Bagley, 
 
 
 58. For a discussion of the origins of mandatory minimums, see Stephanos Bibas, 
Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 936 (2006) 
(“Liberals worried about racial and class disparities . . . conservatives inveighed against lenient 
sentences by soft-on-crime judges.”). For accounts of judges criticizing loss of discretion due 
to mandatory minimums, see United States v. Gregg, 435 F. App’x 209, 217–22 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(Davis, J., concurring); Alan Abrahamson, Judicial Panel Seeks Repeal of Mandatory Sentence 
Law, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 1990), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-29-me-
675-story.html [https://perma.cc/M4JP-Z93Z]; Michael A. Ponsor, The Prisoners I Lose Sleep 
Over, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-prisoners-i-lose-sleep-
overthe-prisoners-i-lose-sleep-over-1392240190 [https://perma.cc/3NL4-K4FR].  
 59. Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass 
Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 856 (2018) (finding that eliminating mandatory 
sentences and narrowing overbroad laws would dramatically reduce prosecutorial leverage). 
 60. Sundby, supra note 15, at 643 (“[T]he courts have understood Brady as not requiring 
disclosure until the trial itself, unless the failure to disclose earlier rendered the trial unfair.”). 
 61. None of the Court’s majority opinions deviate from the following principles: (1) Brady 
is a trial right; (2) Brady is a prosecutorial obligation; and (3) Brady requires disclosure of 
material evidence favorable to defendant. 
 62. 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). 
 63. 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). 
 64. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 702 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Oxman, 
740 F.2d 1298, 1310–11 (3d Cir. 1984)). See Sundby, supra note 15, at 661 (“By the time of 
Bagley, he had come to believe that a prosecutor should have to ‘turn over to the defendant, 
all information known to the government that might reasonably be considered favorable to the 
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no justice would seriously propose to move the pretrial/trial boundary line. In this 
sense, the Court’s more recent holding in United States v. Ruiz—proclaiming a 
prosecutor’s Brady obligation is waived in the event of a pretrial plea—was a die 
already cast.65 In 1977, the Court had already confirmed that the prosecutor’s due 
process duty is limited to ensuring “trials are fair,” that Brady information is essential 
to “trial preparation,” and that “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery 
in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one.”66 The Court in Ruiz remained true 
to the boundary lines that the Court has articulated since deciding Mooney in 1935.67  
The Court’s remaining role has been reduced to calling balls or strikes on the issue 
of whether the prosecutor, at trial, disclosed information that was material to the 
defendant—determining whether consideration of withheld information would have 
led to a “reasonable probability” of a different result.68 Smith v. Cain is the nadir of 
this development: Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas disagree over whether the 
suppressed information would have reasonably led to a different outcome—two 
lawyers having the final argument over the meaning of the same factual record.69 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Kyles v. Whitley was prescient in this sense:  
In a sensible system of criminal justice, wrongful conviction is avoided 
by establishing, at the trial level, lines of procedural legality that leave 
ample margins of safety (for example, the requirement that guilt be 
 
 
defendant’s case.’”). In Moore v. Illinois, Justice Marshall, in dissent, had earlier sought to 
expand the prosecutor’s disclosure obligation to information that is “clearly relevant.” 408 U.S. 
786, 809 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Unthreatened by 
Marshall’s dissent, the majority brushed off his proposal, remarking that there was “no 
constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the 
defense of all police investigatory work on a case.” Id. at 795 (majority opinion). 
 65. See 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (“[T]he Constitution does not require the Government 
to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal 
defendant.”). In Bagley, the Court rejected any distinction between impeachment evidence and 
exculpatory evidence. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; see also United States v. Meregildo, 920 F. 
Supp. 2d 434, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“While discovery is a pretrial mechanism for defendants 
to secure information to marshal their defense, Brady and its progeny are concerned with 
determining whether withheld information was material to the outcome of a trial.”); Miriam 
H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2015) (explaining how the late trigger for Brady 
material further dilutes its effectiveness). 
 66. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977), reaff’d, United States v. Ruiz, 536 
U.S. 622, 629 (2002). 
 67. Under Ruiz, it does not offend due process to force a defendant to determine whether 
to advance to trial without the benefit of assessing information in the State’s possession that 
would lead to acquittal. Ruiz thus permits a prosecutor to misrepresent the strength of her case 
by omission. Should the prosecutor successfully secure a plea by bluff, Ruiz rewards the 
misrepresentation by immunizing her from a Brady claim. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629.  
 68. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. The Court expanded the scope of “material” in Kyles v. 
Whitley to explicitly make the prosecutor responsible for eligible evidence in police files. 514 
U.S. 419 (1995). Brady may be triggered for failure to disclose evidence of the following: 
impeachment, Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2012); a flawed investigation or an alternative 
suspect, Kyles, 514 U.S. at 445; incentivized testimony, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 
154 (1972); and an alibi, State v. Larimore, 17 S.W.3d 87, 91–92 (Ark. 2000).  
 69. See Smith, 565 U.S. at 73. 
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proved beyond a reasonable doubt)—not by providing recurrent and 
repetitive appellate review of whether the facts in the record show those 
lines to have been narrowly crossed.70  
Embedded in Justice Scalia’s frustration is a broader observation that the Court has 
long held in abeyance any significant change to its due process jurisprudence 
governing the distribution of information in criminal disputes. As litigation continues 
to change, the Court’s decision to hold the line and cede the assessment of due 
process during the pretrial phases to other branches begins to look less like judicial 
restraint and more like an act of judicial abdication. 
II. BRADY, ASSESSING THE BENEFITS TO THE PROSECUTOR 
Brady has been understood as a burden on the prosecutor and a benefit to the 
defendant. This is doctrinally correct, as the holding of the case imposes an 
affirmative obligation on the prosecutor and constrains prosecutorial discretion. 
Brady’s obligation even incentivizes some prosecutorial offices to conduct thorough 
pretrial reviews of law enforcement files and to make disclosures during the pretrial 
period.71 Scholarship, meanwhile, has thoroughly vetted Brady’s doctrinal treatment, 
providing insights into how Brady’s promise has been diminished and proposing 
ways in which the doctrine might be more effectively enforced or replaced 
altogether.72  
The questions of whether and how Brady confers benefits to prosecutors, 
however, remains unaddressed. This Article approaches this question by examining 
both some structural, narrative, and political implications of Brady and the resulting 
benefits that potentially accrue to the prosecutor. Structurally, Brady can be 
understood to have validated the reform’s transformation of litigation that 
empowered civil defendants with pretrial discovery rights but deprived criminal 
defendants of the same. The structural component of this Article’s approach builds 
on other scholars’ contributions, such as Scott Sundry’s and Eugene Cerruti’s 
criticisms about the absence of Brady’s pretrial presence within the procedural 
realities of criminal litigation, and Jennifer Laurin’s insights about the Court’s 
deference to executive actors in the pretrial space.73 The main benefit of Brady’s 
structural impact was that the case constitutionally legitimized a prosecutor’s pretrial 
 
 
 70. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 456 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 71. As to jurisdictions that attempt to comply with a prosecutor’s Brady obligation by 
instituting an open-file policy, doing so is often underinclusive—Brady requires a prosecutor 
to review more than her file, but also law enforcement files—and overinclusive, as Brady 
requires no disclosure of information that is merely relevant to the case. See Section I.A. 
 72. See infra notes 110–114 and accompanying text. 
 73. Eugene Cerruti, Through the Looking Glass at the Brady Doctrine: Some New 
Reflections on White Queens, Hobgoblins, and Due Process, 94 KY. L.J. 211, 214 (2005) 
(Brady is now a rule that both encourages and shields pretrial nondisclosure by the prosecutor); 
Jennifer E. Laurin, Quasi-Inquisitorialism: Accounting for Deference in Pretrial Criminal 
Procedure, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 789–90, 794–97 (2014); Sundby, supra note 15, at 
643 (“Once Brady’s development as a constitutional law doctrine is coupled with the realities 
of criminal practice, it should not be surprising that Brady has not generated a large amount 
of pre-trial discovery.”).  
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control over information. Narratively, popular accounts surrounding Brady inflate 
the doctrine’s impact, scope, and reach. The main benefit of Brady’s narrative impact 
is its legitimization of case outcomes.74 Politically, prosecutors have used Brady to 
defeat legislative efforts to expand pretrial discovery. The main benefit of Brady’s 
political impact is its prestige; what the doctrine demands acts as the reference point 
from which arguments to expand pretrial disclosures must contend. 
A. Structural Benefits: The Constitutional Validation of Pretrial Power  
When Mooney was decided, the Court’s due process approach reflected the 
underlying dynamics of litigation: it was during trial when information was 
developed and interrogated by parties. In deciding Brady, the Court would influence 
what process was due within a new world of litigation that understood pretrial 
discovery’s power to shape litigation outcomes. But where civil procedure provided 
for pretrial discovery, criminal litigation did not. Did this dramatic disparity comport 
with due process where trial no longer functioned, at least in civil disputes, as the 
engine of factual contestation? With the creation of a system that provided for much 
more robust development of pretrial information to civil litigants, did an adjacent 
system that provided for virtually no pretrial information to criminal litigants 
comport with due process? The Court answered the question without commenting on 
it by announcing that the prosecutor’s affirmative obligation to turn over information 
under the Constitution did not mature until trial.75 In doing so, the Court implicitly 
legitimated a pretrial regime that deprived criminal defendants of information, even 
as civil defendants were afforded powerful pretrial discovery tools.  
 The timing of Brady’s disclosure requirement—triggered by trial—is not the only 
factor to consider in understanding Brady’s validation of two separate and unequal 
systems of litigation. Brady also defined what information was constitutionally 
required in criminal litigation. And it is certainly not the broad sweep of relevant, 
inadmissible information that characterizes civil discovery entitlements. Instead, 
Brady requires that a prosecutor turn over admissible evidence if it effectively 
constitutes a “smoking gun” that favors a defendant. If due process only requires 
disclosure of this narrowly defined category of information at trial, what information 
could possibly be constitutionally required during the pretrial phase? Certainly 
nothing more than what is triggered by trial, and yet, it is not possible to conceive of 
a narrower category of information than “material and exculpatory.”76 
 Brady thus constructed a wall; on one side of the wall was trial, where a prosecutor 
had to turn over a narrow category of information, and on the other side of the wall 
was a vast pretrial territory, where virtually all disputes resolve and where due 
 
 
 74. See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 15, at 643–44 (“Brady is often heralded as the Supreme 
Court case that granted the criminally accused a constitutional right to discovery . . . . Certainly 
when I first started teaching Brady, I taught it from this heroic viewpoint.”). 
 75. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  
 76. Sundby, supra note 15, at 651 (“This piece of evidence is so exculpatory in nature 
that it actually undermines my belief that a guilty verdict would be worthy of confidence. 
Under Brady, therefore, I need to turn this evidence over to the defense. Then, once I turn the 
evidence over and satisfy my constitutional obligation, I can resume my zealous efforts to 
obtain a guilty verdict that I have just concluded will not be worthy of confidence.”). 
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process is never offended when a prosecutor withholds information from a 
defendant.77 The doctrine is not framed in its inverse, but to do so leaves a sense that 
something is amiss: Brady also stands for the proposition that it does not offend due 
process for a prosecutor to withhold any and all information from a defendant during 
the pretrial phase.78 In proposing a minor adjustment in due process doctrine under 
the guise of judicial restraint, Brady might be reframed as a moment in which the 
Court left a defendant equally vulnerable to the political process and prosecutorial 
influence.  
 How can Brady’s benefit to prosecutors be fully understood? The Court implicitly 
brokered a compromise that imposed limited obligations on the prosecutor at trial 
but signaled to prosecutors that due process concerns did not apply before trial. 
Virtually all cases resolve during the pretrial period; thus, in terms of case volume, 
the prosecutor is statistically the chief beneficiary of Brady’s constitutional 
compromise. The prosecutor is also particularly well positioned to benefit from 
Brady’s facilitation of prosecutorial discretion as to the distribution of pretrial 
information. The State, through its exercise of state power, typically has superior 
resources, better access to critical case information, and the privilege to be that 
information’s interpreter.79 The Brady compromise already amplifies this 
information and resource asymmetry by giving the prosecutor constitutional 
clearance to withhold information that is not material and exculpatory. But the Brady 
compromise also leaves defendants more vulnerable to these dynamics in denying 
them any due process right to test any information before trial. Examples abound: A 
defendant has no constitutional right to propound document requests for investigative 
material essential to a “failure to investigate” defense. A defendant has no 
constitutional right to depose law enforcement officers, insulating officers from 
impeachment opportunities at trial. A defendant has no right to depose eyewitnesses, 
leaving the witness’s motivations a blank slate and foregoing an opportunity to 
develop sophisticated expert testimony that is only possible through a detailed, 
pretrial, accounting of the incident. These type of pretrial opportunities (common 
place to civil litigation) obviously and profoundly shape not only settlement but also 
any trial. Under a robust pretrial discovery regime, the trial is no longer the singular 
moment of adversarial testing but is part of an information-gathering, information-
testing adversarial continuum. In civil litigation, there is just no debate over whether 
the quality of a trial is dependent on the quality of pretrial discovery. As to anyone 
embedded in the criminal system who might adhere to the magical thinking that trial-
by-surprise provides an adequate adversarial forum,80 Brady does much of the work 
to legitimate this specious assertion.  
 
 
 77. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
 78. Ristroph, supra note 9. 
 79. Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 
79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1095 (2014); see also Laurin, supra note 73, at 797. 
 80. The Supreme Court contributes to this magical thinking. As Jennifer Laurin astutely 
observes, the Court has construed police officers, for example, to be technocrats that should 
be trusted to rely on their own “certification and training regimes,” because police have a 
“strong incentive” not to waste limited time and resources. Laurin, supra note 73, at 815–16. 
For the Court to adopt this perspective is to ignore empirical and qualitative data that reveal 
systemic conduct and cultural features that contradict the Court’s depiction. See, e.g., 
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It is difficult to construe Brady’s subsilencio compromise—imposing a narrow 
disclosure obligation on the prosecutor in exchange for constitutional permission to 
refrain from disclosing pretrial information—as an oversight by the Court. As the 
Court considered Brady, it looked upon an unprecedented procedural experiment that 
the Court itself had superintended. The Court was also aware that the Criminal 
Committee, appointed by the Chief Justice, was controlled by prosecutors. By the 
time that the Court had considered Brady, two pretrial systems, disparate and unequal 
in their distribution of information, were defining features of the litigation landscape. 
And where civil litigation’s pretrial experiment was celebrated by the legal 
community during this time, judicial and academic voices were increasingly 
criticizing the comparative disadvantage that the criminal pretrial period visited on 
defendants.81 In announcing that constitutional review would be limited to trial, 
Brady nevertheless signaled that any challenge to the sufficiency of the pretrial 
record would fall outside constitutional review. In this way, Brady had a “power-
conferring” aspect; that is, in creating a zone of regulation, the Court facilitated the 
exercise of state power not only in the trial phase (permitting the prosecutor to 
withhold exculpatory evidence that is merely relevant) but also during the pretrial 
phase (permitting the prosecutor, as a constitutional matter, to withhold any and all 
information from the defendant during the pretrial phase).82  
Under this view, Brady is also situated within what Jennifer Laurin observes as a 
“structure of American criminal procedure doctrine” that “approaches the pretrial 
realm with a comparatively light regulatory touch.”83 Brady, in reserving a large 
swath of territory free from constitutional review, was reflective of a judicial 
commitment to “broad [prosecutorial] pretrial discretion as an embedded feature of 
criminal procedure doctrine.”84 In restricting due process review of the record at trial, 
the Court favored the institutional preferences of the prosecutors that the court not 
intervene in pretrial matters and that any perceived overstepping be addressed 
internally by the prosecutor’s office.85 Laurin observed that courts have been a 
willing partner in this arrangement:  
[I]n regard to the prosecutorial role, the Court has repeatedly advanced a 
conception of the prosecutorial function as being meaningfully overseen 
 
 
COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMISSION REPORT 
1994, 36–37 (1994) (reporting significant level of officers falsifying reports and committing 
perjury); INDEPENDENT COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, at ix-xiv (1991) (reporting 
widespread police misconduct). 
 81. See infra Section II.C.1. 
 82. Ristroph, supra note 9. 
 83. Laurin, supra note 73, at 785 (“Notwithstanding efforts by the Warren Court . . . 
criminal procedure doctrine protects against little other than deliberate law enforcement 
overreach in the course of an investigation . . . .”). 
 84. Id. at 799. 
 85. There are multiple instances in which members of the advisory committee pushed back 
against proposed rules in criminal litigation that interfered with prosecutorial intentions—even 
the idea that a court could set a status conference or control the court calendar was deemed too 
invasive. See Meyn, supra note 6, at 717–20. 
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through a professionally inculcated justice-seeking orientation, 
mechanisms of internal, administrative regulation that guide 
prosecutorial discretion, and viable claims to comparative expertise with 
regard to review, charging, and even (in the context of pleas) case 
disposition.86  
This institutional agreement is self-reinforcing. The judiciary cedes territory to the 
prosecutor based on the presumption that a prosecutor inhabits a special role as a 
minister of justice, a role conception that in turn legitimizes the abdication of judicial 
oversight.87  
By circumscribing the affirmative disclosure obligation of the prosecutor, Brady 
communicated to criminal justice stakeholders that the distribution and interrogation 
of information during the pretrial period was not subject to constitutional review, and 
thereby conferred constitutional legitimacy to the redesign of litigation. In this way, 
the Court’s modest Brady doctrine might be understood as much more sweeping in 
scope and purpose. Viewed as a line-drawing compromise that facilitates the exercise 
of state power during the pretrial period, when most cases resolve, Brady can be 
viewed as a decision that distributed significant benefits to prosecutorial interests.  
B. Narrative Benefits: Legitimizing the Prosecutor’s Role 
A pervasive narrative portrays Brady as imposing a significant burden on the 
prosecutor. Law students are often left with the impression that Brady established a 
special burden on the prosecutor to act against her own interests in service of our 
commitment to due process. Prosecutors portray Brady as a cross to be borne; that 
is, disclosing information damaging to their own case is essential to a full accounting 
of the factual record and a just result. Court opinions, media accounts, as well as 
postconviction briefs filed by defendants will portray Brady’s prosecutorial burden 
as significant. As scholars push back on these conceptions of Brady, the burden-
embellishment narrative continues to persist, and in doing so, provides benefits to 
the prosecutor: the narrative of a burdened prosecutor adds legitimacy to the 
prosecutorial role (to be burdened is to act responsibly) and reinforces the rightness 
of outcomes (to have satisfied a special disclosure obligation is to have ensured that 
a defendant had sufficient information in which to advance a defense).  
In law school, casebooks that introduce students to core concepts must cover 
impressive territory—in criminal procedure, for example, this includes gaining an 
understanding of rights and remedies surrounding investigations, pretrial 
proceedings, trial, sentencing, and appeal. Given the breadth of treatment, emphasis 
in these survey courses is by necessity doctrinal. For this reason, Brady is often 
construed as the judiciary might express its purpose; that is, Brady burdens the 
prosecutor and benefits the defendant. A representative casebook asserts a 
“Defendant’s Right to Discover the State’s Case” with the subtitle: “The classic right 
of a defendant to discover the state’s case comes from Brady v. Maryland.”88 Another 
 
 
 86. Laurin, supra note 73, at 789–90. 
 87. See id. at 810. 
 88. ARNOLD H. LOEWY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 1239 
(3d ed. 2010). But see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (stating prosecutor’s 
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coursebook, consistent with the account that the Warren Court’s jurisprudence had 
effects beyond national borders, observes, “The Court’s first constitutional discovery 
case was a ‘shot heard ‘round the world.’”89 Another account highlights the case’s 
constitutional supremacy over statewide legal regulation: “Brady’s due process 
obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence overrides any limitations on discovery 
provided for by a jurisdiction’s discovery statutes or rules.”90  
Reflecting the influence of a curricular approach that focuses on doctrine, the 
prosecutorial-burden narrative readily finds traction in student articles.91 “By 
recognizing that basic fairness and the integrity of the criminal process were at 
stake,” wrote a future clerk for the Supreme Court, “Brady departed from the view 
of criminal trials as purely adversarial contests. The Brady rule rests on the notion 
that a criminal trial is a search for the truth.”92 “Brady placed new, significant 
disclosure requirements on the prosecution.”93 “Brady v. Maryland is a landmark 
holding . . . to expand the prosecutor’s duty of disclosure.”94 “Because the 
 
 
duty in Brady is limited to ensuring that “trials are fair”); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 
109 (1976) (“If everything that might influence a jury must be disclosed, the only way a 
prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow complete discovery of his 
files as a matter of routine practice. Whether or not procedural rules authorizing such broad 
discovery might be desirable, the Constitution surely does not demand that much.”); Wardius 
v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973) (“Although the Due Process Clause has little to say 
regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded, it does speak to the 
balance of forces between the accused and his accuser.”). 
 89. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 2, at 892. But see scholarship of comparativists who 
note that the “level of nondisclosure” Brady tolerates “would not be tolerated [by] public 
prosecutors in virtually any other mature system of law.” Cerruti, supra note 73, at 214. 
 90. WEAVER ET AL., supra note 2, at 888. Arguably absent from this account is an example 
of Brady overriding state legislation; to conflict with Brady, a state law would have to require 
a prosecutor to withhold exculpatory information at trial. Such a statute presumably has never 
existed. 
 91. Law students have identified cause to criticize Brady, but the case is still understood 
to burden prosecutors. See, e.g., James M. Grossman, Note, Getting Brady Right: Why 
Extending Brady v. Maryland’s Trial Right to Plea Negotiations Better Protects a Defendant’s 
Constitutional Rights in the Modern Legal Era, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1525, 1526 (finding, “[i]n 
today’s criminal justice system, where pleas and plea bargaining are the norm, Brady’s promise 
to defendants rings hollow,” and yet stating, “Brady is a clear and powerful asset for 
defendants”).   
 92. Robert Hochman, Note, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal 
Trials, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1673, 1673–74 (1996). This Note reflects a common sentiment about 
Brady—that disclosure itself is incompatible with adversarialism. Yet it seems that civil 
pretrial proceedings are adversarial even as they require disclosure. Interestingly, one of the 
most influential writers on procedural reform, George Ragland, thought that regimes providing 
for partial disclosures undermine the truth. GEORGE RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 251–
52 (1932) (noting “full and equal discovery” was the best “preventative of perjury,” whereas 
“limited or unequal discovery” fostered “perjury, manufactured testimony, and kindred 
evils.”). 
 93. Michael A. Jeter, Note, Criminal Law—The Right to an Impartial Trial Is Protected 
by an Opportunity to Prove that Juror Bias or Prosecutorial Misconduct Affected the Outcome 
of the Trial Smith v. Phillips, 26 HOW. L.J. 799, 808 (1983). 
 94. Blaise Niosi, Note, Architects of Justice: The Prosecutor’s Role and Resolving 
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government has vastly superior investigative resources with which to discover 
information . . . one of the most valuable rights that a criminal defendant enjoys is 
his constitutional right to all evidence in the government’s possession that is material 
either to his guilt or punishment.”95 These observations not only highlight the 
impression soon-to-be lawyers will have of Brady’s burden but also illustrate the 
powerful link between the narrative of prosecutorial burden and the legitimation of 
criminal-law outcomes.  
Courts also contribute to this narrative. The Supreme Court proclaimed Brady 
“our seminal case on the disclosure of prosecutorial evidence.”96 The Court 
maintains Brady is a “broad obligation” that is “illustrative” of “the special role 
played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trial”;97 
language that is oft cited in federal and state decisions.98 Courts portray Brady as 
exceptional: “[T]he government’s Brady obligation [can be understood] in terms of 
the special status of the American prosecutor.”99 Courts also tie Brady’s obligation 
as a guarantee of legitimate outcomes: “Courts, litigants, and juries properly 
anticipate that obligations to refrain from improper methods to secure a conviction   
. . . will be faithfully observed.”100 The Seventh Circuit contends Brady imposes “a 
special duty to ‘get it right.’”101 The implication: because of Brady, prosecutors get 
it right.  
The burden-embellishment narrative unsurprisingly receives prosecutorial buy-
in.102 For example, Boise Senior Deputy Prosecutor James Dickinson stated, 
prosecutors “understand and accept the high ethical obligation” imposed by Brady.103 
New York Assistant District Attorney Kristin Hamann wrote of Brady’s “ever-
present” demands: the prosecutor is “charged with constructive knowledge of the 
 
 
Whether Inadmissible Evidence Is Material Under the Brady Rule, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1499, 
1307 (2014). 
 95. Mark D. Villaverde, Note, Structuring the Prosecutor’s Duty to Search the 
Intelligence Community for Brady Material, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 1481–82 (2003). 
 96. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 473 (2009). This articulation approaches deception—
though the word “disclosure” is suggestive of a discovery right, the word “evidence” only 
applies to trial.  
 97. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). 
 98. See, e.g., Ross v. Pineda, 549 F. App’x 444 (6th Cir. 2013); Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 
998, 1012 (9th Cir. 2013); Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 2012); Villasana v. 
Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2004); Williams v. Whitley, 940 F.2d 132, 133 (5th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69, 72 (2nd. Cir. 1984); People v. Morris, 756 P.3d 
843, 861 (Cal. 1988); People ex. rel. E.G., 368 P.3d 946, 949 (Colo. 2016); People v. Hayes, 
950 N.E.2d 118, 120 (N.Y. 2011); Commonwealth v. Willis, 46 A.3d 648 (Pa. 2012); In re 
Pers. Restraint of Gentry, 972 P.2d 1250, 1272 (Wash. 1999) (Sanders, J., dissenting). 
 99. Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Strickler, 527            
U.S. 263). 
 100. Tuma v. Commonwealth, 726 S.E.2d, 365, 379 n.10 (Va. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Banks 
v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004)). 
 101. Fields, 672 F.3d at 514. 
 102. See Robert Don Gifford, Ethics and the Criminal Prosecutor: Guilt Shall Not Escape 
nor Innocents Shall Suffer, 76 OKLA. B. J., 2845 (2005). 
 103. Jim Dickinson, Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Favorable Evidence, ADVOCATE, Jan. 
2010, at 25. 
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police investigation and constructive possession of police files,” even though the 
prosecutor may not have “received the information from the police and does not 
know it exists.”104 This account of a significant discovery burden would strike a civil 
litigator as wanting. A civil litigator is expected to secure a much broader sweep of 
information in each and every case, not just a narrow band of information in the 
exceptional case that advances to trial.105 And while a prosecutor works with the 
same players, civil litigators often manage the discovery obligations of multinational 
corporate clients by responding to interrogatories, document production requests, 
and depositions—all from which a prosecutor is excused. The typical account of 
Brady’s burden, however, avoids such comparisons.  
The prosecutorial-burden narrative can come from unlikely sources. Defense 
attorneys contribute to the narrative; their position in litigation often demands 
making this case. In postconviction motions seeking new trials, defense attorneys 
will often introduce Brady in truth-seeking terms to describe a doctrine that requires 
something significant of the prosecutor, a strategically sound approach to push 
against Brady’s doctrinal margins in the hope of receiving postconviction table 
scraps.106 It may also be surprising that progressive media outlets will contribute to 
a popular understanding that Brady imposes a heavy burden on the prosecutor. 
Andrew Cohen at The Atlantic wrote that the Supreme Court used Brady as “a vehicle 
to memorialize a constitutional rule that burdened prosecutors with an affirmative 
duty to share with criminal defendants evidence that by its very definition would 
undermine the prosecution’s case.”107 Linda Greenhouse included Brady among the 
key cases representing the “Warren Court’s progressive constitutional revolution at 
the peak of its energy and transformative power,” signaling that Brady contributed 
to significant, prodefendant, change.108 Radley Balko in The Huffington Post wrote, 
“The Brady decision was really about establishing fundamental fairness in the 
criminal justice system and making trials a search for truth, rather than lawyering 
competitions.”109  
 
 
 104. Kristin Hamann, Getting It Right: Practical Approaches to 21st Century Prosecution, 
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 3, 2013, at 2. 
 105. Sundby, supra note 15, at 659 (“[T]he fact that nine out of ten cases are resolved by 
guilty pleas ensures that Brady plays a minimal role in triggering prosecutorial disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1071, 1098 (2017) (noting low success rate of Brady claims); Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. 
Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 144–45 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (noting low success rate of 
Brady claims); Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 489 
(2009) (contending a prosecutor can suppress information “knowing there is little chance the 
evidence will ever come to light”).  
 107. Andrew Cohen, Prosecutors Shouldn’t Be Hiding Evidence from Defendants, 
ATLANTIC (May 13, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/05/prosecutors 
-shouldnt-be-hiding-evidence-from-defendants/275754/ [https://perma.cc/33DJ-WZ2K]. 
 108. Linda Greenhouse, The Rigorous Romantic: Anthony Lewis on the Supreme Court 
Beat, 79 MO. L. REV. 907, 907 (2014). 
 109. Radley Balko, Brady v. Maryland Turns 50, But Defense Attorneys Aren’t 
Celebrating, HUFFINGTON POST (May 13, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/13 
/brady-v-maryland-50_n_3268000.html [https://perma.cc/HG86-KLQQ]. 
904 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:883 
 
Against these strong currents, scholarship has labored to move past this narrative. 
For example, scholars have broadly critiqued Brady’s enforcement mechanisms: that 
placing compliance in the hands of the prosecutor leads to underenforcement;110 that 
the late timing of its disclosure obligation undermines a prosecutor’s ability to be 
objective;111 and that obstacles particular to postconviction procedure undermine 
efforts to prove up violations.112 In the course of identifying doctrinal flaws, some 
frame the case as having had the promise to impose a significant burden on the 
prosecutor.113 Some proposed alternative means—like open file policies—are 
 
 
 110. See, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs 
Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391, 
397 (1984) (arguing that the pretrial burden of determining the favorability of evidence should 
be on an independent, objective fact finder of the trial court through an in camera review); 
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 
86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 463–64 (2001) (“Congress and state legislatures should pass legislation 
establishing Prosecution Review Boards.”); Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: 
Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1088–
1105 (2009) (proposing a list to shame prosecutors who violate Brady); Jason Kreag, The 
Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 47 (2014) (proposing a pretrial, on the record 
colloquy in which a judge would question the prosecutor about her efforts to comply with 
Brady); Medwed, supra note 3, at 1542 (proposing remedies to address “lapses of judgment 
regarding prosecutor’s disclosure obligations”); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions 
Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 731 (1987) 
(contending that given evidence of “intentional Brady-type misconduct, the instances of 
discipline are too rare” and arguing for a bad faith standard); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong 
Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose 
Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. Rev. 833, 870 (1997); Fred C. Zacharias, The 
Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 722 (2001) (noting “dearth of 
cases in which disciplinary authorities have sanctioned prosecutors”). 
 111. Baer, supra note 65, 35–38 (observing that, as the eve of trial approaches, prosecutors 
are less able to objectively review a case).  
 112. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 106, at 484; Justin Murray, Prejudiced-Based Rights in 
Criminal Procedure, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 302 (2020) (examining how the outcome-
determinative appellate review standard serves to dilute Brady’s burden); Eve Brensike 
Primus, The Illusory Right to Counsel, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 597, 606, 608 (2011) (finding 
state procedure typically leaves defendants to bring postconviction Brady claims pro se); Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It’s Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 
UDC/DCSL L. Rev. 275, 291 (“[P]rosecutors know that there is little, if any, remedy for 
misconduct because the appellate standard of review is harmless error.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The 
Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 190 (1983) (noting that 
Brady was  the case that “promoted the system’s capacity to adjudicate guilt more reliably”); 
Capra, supra note 110, at 392 (noting Brady “was a major step forward in equalizing access 
to exculpatory evidence”); Davis, supra note 110, at 431 (noting that Brady was intended to 
be “expansive” in its requirements); Harvey Gee, Chasing the Dragon: The Forgotten Story 
of Wong Sun v. United States, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 159, 160 (2011) (reviewing CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE STORIES (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006)) (noting Brady is considered a consensus 
candidate in the “Criminal Procedure Revolution” canon that “strengthened the constitutional 
rights of individuals within the criminal justice system”); Bruce I. Kogan & Cheryl L. 
Robertson, Chief Justice Joseph R. Weisberger’s Page of History, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 501, 525–26 (2001) (noting Brady as a “seminal decision” that “constitutionalized the 
2020] FLIPPING THE SCRIPT ON BRADY 905 
 
necessary to achieve Brady’s due process aspirations.114 A consistent message of 
these wide-ranging critiques, however, is the doctrine’s present failure to impose a 
demanding burden on the prosecutor.115  
Yet, this scholarship competes with the drumbeat of the many sources that 
proclaim Brady’s prosecutorial burden to be significant. Many, if not most, law 
students will not have the opportunity to delve into the rich criticism that reveals 
Brady’s shortcomings. Instead, they will enter the profession with an impression that 
Brady imposes a special burden, unique to the American prosecutor—Brady is a case 
that speaks to our identity as to the values we hold.116 This inflated, unearned 
narrative in turn confers a benefit to prosecutors by lending legitimacy to outcomes 
and promoting “the system’s capacity to adjudicate guilt more reliably.”117 
C. Political Benefits: A Shield Against Legislative Efforts to Expand Pretrial 
Discovery 
In assessing the potential benefits of Brady to prosecutors, another use of the case 
emerges: its deployment to achieve policy objectives. When the Criminal Committee 
in the early 2000s considered making amendments to pretrial rules governing the 
exchange of information, the Department of Justice (DOJ) was well positioned to 
lobby for its preferences. The DOJ is formally represented on the Criminal 
Committee, and in addition, DOJ representatives are permitted to voice concerns 
directly to the Criminal Committee.118 The use of Brady as a vehicle to influence any 
changes by the Committee did not occur until the early 2000s, when it became a 
centerpiece over the state of pretrial discovery in criminal disputes. In some ways, 
Brady’s lack of earlier influence on the rulemaking process reflects its quiet reception 
and the impression that the case had little to do with the Committee’s work, which 
 
 
State’s obligation to disclose evidence”); Medwed, supra note 3, at 1540 (noting that Brady 
was intended to be “broad” in its requirements). 
 114. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 106, at 512, 514 (proposing an open-file disclosure 
requirement that requires disclosure of inculpatory and exculpatory evidence); Medwed, supra 
note 3, 1158–59 (proposing the possibility of an open-file disclosure requirement to counteract 
the doctrine’s inherent flaws); Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After 
Connick and Garcetti, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1376–77 (2012) (proposing an open-file 
regime to replace Brady); Yaroshefsky, supra note 112, at 295 (observing that changes “in 
discovery obligations from less of a ‘cat and mouse game’ to relatively open discovery would 
afford the true believer less opportunity to stretch ethical boundaries”). 
 115. See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 3 at 686 (“[O]ne is struck by the dissonance between 
Brady’s grand expectations to civilize U.S. criminal justice and the grim reality of its largely 
unfulfilled promise”); id. at 713 (discussing how the materiality standard’s lack of any rigor 
“in practice rendered suppression of favorable evidence a routine and rational act”); Moore,  
supra note 114, at 1376–77 (“From Brady’s inception onward, constitutional doctrine has 
prioritized deference to prosecutorial discretion over enforceability.”). 
 116. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 108, at 907 (including Brady among cases 
representing the “Warren Court’s progressive constitutional revolution at the peak of its 
energy and transformative power”); Hochman, supra note 92, at 1674 (“The Brady rule rests 
on the notion that a criminal trial is a search for the truth.”). 
 117. Kogan & Robertson, supra note 113, at 525–26. 
 118. Id. 
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was to regulate information exchange during the pretrial (versus trial) phase of 
litigation.119 
1. The Legislative Process Encounters Brady 
Consistent with Brady’s quiet arrival, as the Criminal Committee convened and 
considered its rulemaking agenda after Brady was decided, there was no mention of 
the case.120 This silence was even more pronounced given that key terms in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCP) mirrored terms in the Brady standard. 
Where Brady required disclosure of “material” information, so did the FRCP. In 
1946, the original version of Rule 16, for example, provided a defendant could 
request the court order the prosecutor to permit the examination of “material” 
documents that were seized from defendant or third parties.121 Nevertheless, after the 
Court announced the Brady decision, the Committee did not think the decision 
sufficiently notable to merit mention in the meetings immediately following the case. 
In the 1960s, academics and jurists began calling attention to the disparity 
between civil and criminal discovery.122 Gideon’s mandate had propagated public-
 
 
 119. See supra text accompanying notes 48–50. 
 120. Minutes from Rules Committee meetings between 1963 and 1967 make not a single 
mention of Brady. See THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES (Oct. 
14–16, 1963), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR10-1963-min.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NJ6C-5A6Z]; THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING 
MINUTES (Jan. 13–15, 1964), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR01-
1964-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD8G-88ND]; THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, 
MEETING MINUTES (May 3–4, 1965), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/C 
R05-1965-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/W76D-9ELF]; THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL 
RULES, MEETING MINUTES (May 23, 1966), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_im 
port/CR05-1966-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/9W2X-ZND3]; THE ADVISORY COMM. ON 
CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES (Sept. 11–12, 1967), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/def 
ault/files/fr_import/CR09-1967-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XRF-4D89]. Though proposals 
initiated in 1961 did not finalize until 1966, Brady’s publication in 1963 had no discernible 
impact on Committee discussions. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING 
MINUTES 8–13 (Jan. 13–14, 1964), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR 
01-1964-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2S2-6KHE] (relating to FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, proposing 
disclosure of defendant’s statements, results of relevant examinations, and defendant’s 
recorded grand-jury testimony). The Committee did refer to and discuss other 
contemporaneous cases in determining appropriate changes; for example, in 1967, the 
Committee discussed Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 94 (1967), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966).  THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES (SEPT. 11–
12, 1967), supra, at 3, 14. 
 121. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (1946) (last amended 2013). 
 122. See, e.g., Robert L. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. 
REV. 293 (1960); Goldstein, supra note 50; Hall, supra note 48; Sheldon Krantz, Pretrial 
Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 NEB. L. REV. 127, 
144–51 (1963); David W. Louisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of 
Criminal Law, 14 VAND. L. REV. 921, 927–28 (1961); Comment, Developments in the Law—
Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1057 (1961) (recommending exchange of witness lists 
coupled with opportunity to depose witnesses); Comment, Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal 
Cases, 60 Yale L.J. 626, 640–46 (1951) (recommending adoption of civil discovery, including 
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defender offices, and from these ranks emerged a more organized push for criminal 
discovery.123 Congress proposed a bill in 1966 that “would direct the Supreme Court, 
[and therefore the Advisory Committee] to make adequate discovery rules.”124 In 
1968, the Committee amended Rule 16 to include documents “material” to the 
“preparation of [the] defense,” a change that reflected political currents favoring the 
expansion of pretrial criminal discovery.125 And yet, despite the shared language, one 
could sense the Committee’s wariness about Brady’s significance to the FRCP—
meeting notes in 1968 indicate, “Brady v. Maryland should be left to the development 
of the case law and should not be in the rule. A note should be added to the effect 
[that] the committee is not attempting to codify Brady v. Maryland at present.”126 In 
recognizing the case’s nonapplication to pretrial discovery, the Committee was still 
acknowledging Brady’s shadow.  
The Committee would in fact note this sentiment in its annotation to the 1976 
Amendment to the FRCP.127 By then, Rule 16 was changed to remove the court as 
an obstacle; a defendant only needed to issue a request to the prosecutor to initiate 
the requirement that the State turn over documents material to the preparation of the 
defense.128 What, if any, was Brady’s impact on this obligation? The Committee was 
vague: “[T]he committee had ‘decided not to codify the Brady Rule.’ . . . [But] ‘the 
requirement that the government disclose documents and tangible objects “material 
to the preparation of his defense” underscores the importance of disclosure of 
evidence favorable to the defendant.’”129 Some courts would interpret Rule 16’s 
materiality limitation to require a broader sweep of information than Brady, while 
other courts would interpret Rule 16’s demand to be coterminous with Brady.130 In 
 
 
depositions). A few judges explicitly recognized disparities between civil and criminal 
procedure. Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 228, 233 (1964). 
 123. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2192 (2002) 
(noting Gideon led to a growth in public defender offices); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual 
Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 
2426, n.33 (noting rapid expansion of public defender offices after Gideon). Vermont and 
Florida afforded discovery rights to criminal defendants in the 1960s. 1961 Vt. Acts & 
Resolves 174–76; In re Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 211 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1968); Peter 
Forbes Langrock, Vermont’s Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A. J. 732, 732 (1967).  
 124. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES (May 23, 1966), supra 
note 120, at 7. 
 125. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b) (1968) (last amended 2013). 
 126. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 15 (Sept. 30–Oct. 1, 
1968) (emphasis added), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR09-1968-
min.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJV7-8UJG]; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. 
 127. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (1976) (advisory committee’s note to its amendment effective 
1976). 
 128. See id.  
 129. LAURAL L. HOOPER, JENNIFER E. MARSH & BRIAN YEH, TREATMENT OF BRADY V. 
MARYLAND MATERIAL IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT AND STATE COURTS’ RULES, ORDERS, AND 
POLICIES: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 2 (2004) (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note). 
 130. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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some respects, this split was a tempest in a teapot; in the end, Rule 16 provided for 
little more than it did in 1946, given that Rule 16’s expansion to include all 
documents in the prosecutor’s “possession, custody, and control”131 was diminished 
by a provision that relieved the prosecutor from disclosing police reports—a 
sweeping exemption.132 Compared to civil discovery, the amendments were anemic: 
no criminal rule was in sight of civil rules that empowered parties to compel the 
disclosure of relevant information through powerful tools.133 
Within these inconsequential moves of the dial on criminal pretrial discovery, 
Brady’s role in rulemaking was uncertain, which was evident by the Committee’s 
struggle to contextualize Brady. The Committee seemed inclined to treat Brady as a 
floor, not a ceiling. At the same time, the Committee avoided a declaration of 
independence from Brady. On display was Brady’s power to disorient the process of 
constructing pretrial discovery, even as Brady had, according to the Court, nothing 
to do with pretrial discovery. However momentarily the Committee might have been 
inspired to expand pretrial discovery in the late 1960s, it did not stray far from 
Brady’s articulation of due process, and it built in the doctrine as a reference point. 
If Brady had nothing to do with pretrial discovery, it also seemed to superintend and 
constrain it. 
2. Prosecutors Learn to Wield Brady 
The Court’s decision in United States v. Ruiz explicitly relieved prosecutors from 
making any Brady disclosure in a case that resolved by plea.134 Although Ruiz was 
consistent with prior decisions of the Court that announced Brady’s obligation was 
 
 
 131. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1). 
 132. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2); ROBERT M. CARY, CRAIG D. SINGER & SIMON A. 
LATCOVICH, FEDERAL CRIMINAL DISCOVERY 135–36 (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2011). 
 133. Meyn, supra note 79, at 1094 (distinguishing discretion given to civil litigants from 
limited disclosures extended to criminal defendants); Jeffrey E. Stone & Corey B. Rubenstein, 
Criminal Discovery: Leveling the Playing Field, 23 LITIG. 45, 45 (1997) (observing that, under 
the federal rules, a defendant is entitled to “(1) any statement [he] was foolish enough to make 
. . . (2) his criminal record . . . (3) documents . . . to be used by the government at trial; (4) 
reports of examinations . . .  and (5) expert witness summaries. State prosecutors often have 
similar discovery obligations . . . .”). The rules do not “require the parties to disclose 
witnesses.” CARY ET AL., supra note 132, at 417. Views on changes to federal rules widely 
differ. Compare Susan R. Klein, Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 559, 570 
(2013) (“The 1966 amendments . . . hugely increased the range and scope of pretrial discovery 
. . . .”), with Cary Clennon, Pre-Trial Discovery of Witness Lists: A Modest Proposal to 
Improve the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Superior Court of the District of 
Columbia, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 641, 652–53 (1989) (contending 1966 reciprocity provision 
advantaged the State), Meyn, supra note 79, at 1135–36 (observing no amendment has ever 
provided defendant discretionary discovery), and Sara Kropf, Andrew George, William C. 
Cleveland & Julie Rubenstein, The ‘Chief’ Problem with Reciprocal Discovery Under Rule 
16, CHAMPION, Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 20, 20 (arguing Rule 16 is harmful to defendants). Rule 
16(a)(2) exempts most police reports from disclosure. Doctrinal treatment has also narrowed 
scope of rules. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 462 (1996) (giving 
“material to the preparation of [his] defense” a tight frame). 
 134. 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002). 
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limited to trial,135 the Court’s “we mean what we say” moment in Ruiz stunned the 
many who had assumed Brady meant something more. After all, coursebooks, and 
prosecutors and defendants rallied around the idea that Brady required something 
special of the prosecutor, distinct from other litigants in the American system, and 
distinct from prosecutors around the world.136 Although the Court in Ruiz announced 
that Brady’s wet blanket on due process (which was always there) was in fact there, 
the decision also inspired action. Notably, the opinion moved the American College 
of Trial Lawyers (ACTL) to attempt to persuade the Criminal Committee to expand 
pretrial disclosures to defendants. ACTL submitted to the Committee a report 
entitled, “Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable Information Under 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure” (“ACTL Report”),137 drafted by ACTL’s 
Committee on Federal Procedure, which included Judge Charles Breyer (Northern 
District of California), R. Stan Mortenson (President Nixon’s former attorney), Ty 
Cobb (President Trump’s former attorney), and white-collar defense attorneys like 
John Cooney, Robert Tarun, Thomas Dwyer, and Douglas Young.138 The opening 
salvo reads: 
In the 1963 landmark decision of Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court 
held that prosecutors have a constitutional duty to turn over “evidence 
favorable to an accused. . . . [sic] where the evidence is material either to 
guilt or to punishment.” Four decades later, [the federal rules that] govern 
federal plea negotiations and criminal discovery . . . still do not address, 
let alone require, the government to timely disclose favorable 
information to the defendant that is material to either guilt or sentencing.  
Without a clear definition of favorable evidence nor a disclosure 
timetable, prosecutors have interpreted the constitutional discovery 
obligation inconsistently and too often disclosed favorable information 
on the eve, during, or after trial or not at all.139 
The ACTL Report emphasized how pretrial disclosure of information is critical 
to ensuring a fair process of plea bargaining and that the early disclosure of 
information favorable to a defendant is essential to obtaining legitimate outcomes, 
due to its impact on plea negotiations.140  
ACTL’s proposal claimed to codify Brady in the pretrial space. In fact, ACTL 
attempted to broaden the disclosure obligation to information “favorable” to 
defendant. Thus, the ACTL Report sought to move the boundary lines of Brady in 
 
 
 135. See supra text accompanying notes 61–67.  
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 88–95.  
 137. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE OF 
FAVORABLE INFORMATION UNDER FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11 AND 16 (2003).  
 138. The American College of Trial Lawyers states that membership “is extended only by 
invitation . . . to those experienced trial lawyers [with a minimum 15 years of experience] . . . 
whose professional careers have been marked by the highest standards . . . .” Fellowship in the 
College, AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS (2019), https://www.actl.com/home/membership 
[https://perma.cc/4QLS-BPWK]. 
 139. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 138, at 1 (quoting Brady v. 
Maryland, 372 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). 
 140. Id. at 1–2. 
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terms of timing (as early as two weeks after a complaint was filed) and scope 
(removing the materiality requirement and rendering any relevant information 
favorable to defendant discoverable).141 The proposal was reasonable, argued ACTL, 
given that robust discovery rights were granted to civil litigants: “It is anomalous that 
in civil cases, where generally all that is at stake is money, access to information is 
assured; however, in contrast, in criminal cases, where liberty is at issue, the defense 
is provided far less information.”142 The Criminal Committee put the ACTL Report 
on its agenda.143 ACTL, then, in arguing for pretrial discovery, had attempted to 
weaponize Brady—arguing that, due to Brady’s inadequate obligations, the 
Committee needed to intervene in the pretrial discovery space. 
Minutes of the Committee’s first full meeting in May 2004 indicate that Member 
Donald J. Goldberg (who practiced white-collar defense) “agreed with the 
Department of Justice’s view that Brady is really a post-trial rule.”144 The DOJ 
liaison, Deborah J. Rhodes, objected that “the proposed amendment is inconsistent 
with the case law and would transform a trial right into a discovery right, which 
conflicts with the Jencks Act.”145 The Committee voted to further investigate 
ACTL’s proposal, appointing a subcommittee; notably Goldberg and Rhodes, along 
with three others, were placed on the subcommittee. 
The Committee met five months later. The DOJ attempted a new framing: 
prosecutors already practiced what the proposal required.146 Proponents of ACTL’s 
proposal had an easy retort: if prosecutors already did what the proposed rule 
required, what harm was there in adopting the proposal?147 This question, however 
rational, ignored the real stakes at issue. The proposed rule threatened the sanctity of 
the prosecutor’s minister-of-justice role that conferred privileges of self-regulation 
 
 
 141. The ACTL Report’s proposal 
contains no requirement that the information be “material” to the defense. . . . 
[That] “[i]nformation favorable to the defendant” is sufficiently clear to guide 
the government attorneys at the pre-trial stage. [And, in addition, a] materiality 
standard is only appropriate in the context of an appellate review since 
determinations of materiality are best made in light of all the evidence addressed 
at trial. 
Id. at 20. 
 142. Id. at 11. 
 143. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 12 (May 6–7, 2004), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR5-2004_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG 
U8-3XJZ]. 
 144. Id. (emphasis added). 
 145. Id. The Jencks Act requires the prosecutor to turn over a statement of a government’s 
witness after that witness has testified. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2018). In requiring the disclosure 
after a witness has testified, the Act has been interpreted to relieve a prosecutor from turning 
over such information at an earlier date. Some conflicts arise as to whether the prosecutor’s 
Brady obligation (to divulge exculpatory impeachment evidence before trial, for example) 
trumps the Jencks Act, which requires a prior statement of a witness after testimony. United 
States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 117 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 146. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 7 (Oct. 30, 2004), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR10-2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM 
L6-3PWE].  
 147. Id. 
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and an absence of external accountability measures. In the next meeting, the DOJ 
objected to the proposed rule’s scope (that a prosecutor turn over information 
“favorable to defendant”) as it was “difficult to distinguish between inculpatory and 
exculpatory evidence” (even though Rhodes had earlier argued that adequate 
protection was offered by Brady, which was somehow clear even though it requires 
a prosecutor turn over “exculpatory” evidence).148 The DOJ’s arguments led to an 
October 2005 dilution of ACTL’s proposal:  
[U]pon a defendant’s request, the government must make available no 
later than the start of trial all information that is known to the government 
. . . that the government has reason to believe may be favorable to the 
defendant because it tends to be either exculpatory or impeaching. The 
court may order disclosure earlier, but in no instance more than 14 days 
before trial.149 
The DOJ was still opposed, however, objecting that the amendment went “well 
beyond the constitutional standard identified by Supreme Court case law.”150 
Viewing Brady as a ceiling on the prosecutor’s affirmative disclosure obligations, 
the DOJ was deploying the doctrine to defeat efforts to expand discovery in the 
pretrial period. 
The DOJ proposed a compromise; in exchange for dropping the proposal, the DOJ 
would consider integrating the proposal’s language for “possible inclusion in the 
U.S. Attorney’s Manual.”151 In April 2006, Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty 
attended Committee discussions, representing that the DOJ had circulated revisions 
to the manual “as an alternative to amending Rule 16.”152 The amended manual 
would require prosecutors “to weigh materiality before disclosing . . . but 
[prosecutors] would be encouraged to construe materiality broadly.”153 Proponents 
of the proposal still thought a rule would better ensure compliance, but the DOJ’s 
suggestion had some effect, as Committee support for the proposal weakened. The 
issue was tabled. 
In September 2006, the DOJ informed the Committee that the manual had 
received approval from “all relevant Department officials, including Deputy 
 
 
 148. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 6–7 (Apr. 4–5, 2005), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR04-2005-min.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/7VQU-P53U]. 
 149. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 9 (Oct. 24–25, 2005), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR10-2005-min.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/BNF2-VHKG]. Rhodes contended that such a disclosure could not occur earlier than trial 
because “between 93 and 96 percent of federal cases result[] in a plea rather than a trial[, so] 
it is critical that lay witnesses be exposed only in those cases that actually proceed to trial.” Id. 
at 11. 
 150. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
 151. Id. at 10. 
 152. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 9 (April 3–4, 2006), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR04-2006-min.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/6AR6-G94S]. 
 153. Id. at 10. 
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Attorney General Paul McNulty.”154 The DOJ acknowledged that the manual did not 
track the Committee’s proposal but emphasized that amending the language was a 
“substantial step.”155 The DOJ made clear it would oppose the proposal if it went any 
further; this position seemed to reinvigorate the Committee, which voted to send the 
proposed language (however diluted) to the Standing Committee (for referral to 
Congress).156 Deputy Attorney General McNulty strongly opposed the proposal 
during its presentation to the Standing Committee, which rejected the proposal.157 
The Standing Committee “suggested that the . . . [C]ommittee consider whether to 
continue studying the . . . proposal.”158 Further time passed; the Federal Judicial 
Center reported that its study found no evidence of widespread noncompliance with 
Brady—a premise that had no relationship to the motivations of the ACTL Report, 
which was to ensure that obligations under Brady be exceeded to include pretrial 
disclosures.159  
In April 2009, Judge Emmet Sullivan, who presided over the trial of a U.S. 
Senator that involved severe Brady violations,160 wrote to the Committee urging 
them to reconsider the pretrial codification of Brady.161 Immediately, the DOJ 
reiterated opposition to any pretrial expansion of the rules, with Brady as the 
centerpiece, noting a change going beyond Brady’s doctrinal requirements would be 
“inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, would upset the careful 
congressionally-mandated balance inherent in criminal discovery under the Jencks 
Act, and would disregard critical interests such as the rights and safety of witnesses 
and special concerns relating to cases implicating national security.”162 The DOJ now 
offered to create a position within the DOJ to direct and oversee prosecutorial 
discovery obligations under Brady.163 In the face of continued resistance from the 
DOJ, in April of 2011, the subcommittee reported that it had “been unable to agree 
on any acceptable amendment.”164 The Committee discussed the efforts made by the 
DOJ to manage prosecutorial discovery obligations, including the appointment of a 
 
 
 154. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 2 (Sept. 5, 2006), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR09-2006-min.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/H6NG-HNBZ].  
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 7.  
 157. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 5 (Oct. 1–2, 2007), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR10-2007-min.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/GX2G-27R6].  
 158. Id.  
 159.  See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 138. 
 160. Anna Stolley Persky, A Cautionary Tale: The Ted Stevens Prosecution, WASH. LAW. 
(Oct. 2009), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/oct 
ober-2009-ted-stevens.cfm [https://perma.cc/Z86V-G3XC]. 
 161. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 5 (Oct. 13, 2009), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CR10-2009-min.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/JG5E-C3CF]. 
 162. Id. at 6. 
 163. Id. 
 164. THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 11 (Apr. 11–12, 
2011), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/criminal-min-04-2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7EYY-3AUB].  
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National Criminal Discovery Coordinator, law enforcement personnel training, 
electronic management of discovery, and instituting a policy of “[w]hen in doubt, 
disclose.”165 The Committee voted 6–5 against a proposed expansion of pretrial 
discovery.166 
The DOJ had effectively used Brady—which the DOJ in individual cases 
routinely and vigorously argues has absolutely no bearing on pretrial discovery167—
to constitute the ceiling for all discovery, whether pretrial or trial. The courts, 
however, were clear that Brady left pretrial discovery to legislative regulation. And 
the Committee’s process was legislative in nature. Yet, the DOJ was arguing that 
Brady foreclosed any legislative expansion of pretrial discovery. The minimum 
discovery required by due process at trial, according to the DOJ, was the maximum 
discovery required of prosecutors. 
Completing the circle, the DOJ’s reliance on Brady to justify unilateral control 
over the pretrial period reveals Brady’s legitimizing power—that is, Brady lent 
constitutional legitimacy to the dramatic transfer of power over information from the 
judge to the prosecutor after procedural reform in the 1940s. As legislative reform 
expanded prosecutorial power still more, the dominant narrative of Brady—that it is 
a landmark case that constrained the prosecutor and gave constitutional heft to the 
prosecutor’s role as minister of justice—has been used as a means to validate this 
expansion of power. These benefits conferred by Brady to prosecutorial interests are 
arguably substantial.  
III. ADDRESSING DUE PROCESS QUESTIONS NOT ADDRESSED BY BRADY 
Flipping the script on Brady—that the doctrine ceded constitutional regulation of 
the pretrial period to the prosecutor, legitimized case outcomes through narrative 
overstatement of its burden, and was effectively used to achieve legislative objectives 
of the DOJ—recasts Brady as a potential prosecutorial ally and a threat to adversarial 
balance. In this reframing, the Court’s “restraint” in limiting due process review to 
the trial moment after the legislature had ceded control over pretrial discovery to the 
prosecutor can be understood as judicial appeasement to prosecutorial interests.  
The reframing of Brady as a doctrine that allows a prosecutor to withhold 
information during the pretrial period invites reassessment of due process norms. 
ACTL was not alone in raising the alarm about the disparity in information exchange 
between civil and criminal disputes. The Court’s assertion that Brady does not 
govern pretrial proceedings, for example, is now contested by a significant number 
of federal jurisdictions that, by local rule, require Brady material to be disclosed 
 
 
 165. Id. at 11.  
 166. Id. at 15. Instead, the Committee went forward with their attempt to influence more 
“soft” practices like the Federal Judicial Center bench book and DOJ policy changes. Id. at 
15–16.  
 167. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner, United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (No. 
01-595), 2002 WL 657759 (“Respondent contends that the court of appeals’ holding that a 
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to receive material exculpatory information before 
pleading guilty is supported by [Brady]. But Brady and the decisions applying it hold no more 
than that the government has a duty to disclose exculpatory information when such disclosure 
is necessary to ensure a fair trial.”). 
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during, and sometimes early in, the pretrial period.168 As the battle over Brady’s 
timing continues, in some ways the war has been won by prosecutorial interests. As 
long as the focus remains on Brady, then what information due process actually 
requires in criminal litigation is defined by Brady.169 And Brady is a weak taskmaster 
compared to the pretrial information demands of civil litigation. Meanwhile, the 
consolidation of prosecutorial power during the pretrial period has become complete. 
The prosecutor now serves as both a party to the lawsuit and the arbitrator of facts 
and law.170 The confluence of “the prosecutor’s investigating, charging, convicting, 
and sentencing powers,” coupled with “the ‘inherent inequality’ between the 
prosecutor and the defendant,” as Bennett Gershman observed, has rendered “the 
adversary system almost obsolete.”171 David Sklansky portrayed the prosecutor as an 
intermediary between “law and politics, rules and discretion, courts and police, 
advocacy and objectivity”—a boundary-blurring position that necessarily 
consolidates power.172 The prosecutorial-burden narrative works to deflect concern 
over this consolidation and helps justify the prosecutorial impulse to insist on self-
governance.173 Thus, as scholarship, the Criminal Committee, and judges continue 
to raise questions over Brady’s timing and scope, alternative due process approaches 
deserve consideration. 
 
 
 168. HOOPER ET AL., supra note 129, at 12; Daniel McConkie, The Local Rules Revolution 
in Criminal Discovery, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 59, 105 (2017). 
 169. Burke, supra note 106, at 483 (recognizing the value of sustained scholarly efforts to 
improve effectiveness and enforcement but concluding that a significant doctrinal shift is 
required to achieve the due process promise of Brady). 
 170. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117, 2118 (1998) (observing how the prosecutor role had morphed into including the 
role as arbitrator). 
 171. Gershman, supra note 50, at 395. These circumstances permit prosecutors to engage 
in coercive tactics to secure pleas. See Maximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The 
Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 223, 225 (2006). 
 172. David Alan Sklansky, Criminology: The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 
106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 520 (2016); see also Daniel Epps, Adversarial 
Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 783 (2016) (contending the 
dualistic role of the prosecutor is confusing and does not serve the ends of justice). 
 173. The temptation to prosecutors to consolidate power has been a constant one. Examples 
abound: In 1931, the presidentially appointed Wickersham Commission wondered if “the 
prosecutor’s office were properly organized, [whether] no public defender would be required,” 
as a prosecutor considers the welfare of the State, and the accused is a member of the State. 
NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENF’T, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 33 (1931). The 
prosecutorial charge to represent “the people” rendered the defense attorney superfluous, given 
that defendant was part of the people. In 1989, for example, the United States Attorney General 
in a “Memorandum to All Justice Department Litigators” announced that prosecutors would 
be exempt from the prohibition on contacting persons represented by counsel, alleviating 
prosecutors of ethical constraints that apply to the rest of the bar. The self-conception of being 
exceptional was expressed early by Gershman, supra note 50, at 403 (citing Memorandum to 
All Justice Dep’t Litigators from Dick Thornburgh, Attorney Gen. (June 8, 1989)). 
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A. Can the Prosecutor Withhold Pretrial Information? 
Brady is not understood to allow prosecutors to withhold pretrial information with 
constitutional impunity, regardless of the information’s value to a criminal 
defendant. But Brady allows that. Most of all criminal cases—ninety-five percent—
resolve pretrial, the period in which the Court in Brady ceded governance over 
discovery to the legislature. Due process doctrine constitutionally permits the 
prosecutor to withhold relevant, material, exculpatory, and inculpatory information 
during the pretrial phrase, as well as information that bears on the credibility of 
witnesses or the reliability of documents. Under these constitutional nonconditions, 
a number of jurisdictions have opted to provide for no pretrial disclosures.174 In these 
jurisdictions, prosecutors wield unilateral control over the development and 
distribution of pretrial information. This allowance permits the prosecutor to make 
representations of fact that are not supported by the State’s file, which again, would 
not constitute a due process violation.  
If the perception is that Brady imposes a significant burden on the prosecutor, the 
question might be asked: compared to whom? But this question, under current 
doctrine, is not permitted. This is the power of Medina v. California, a criminal case 
in which the Court rejected a due process analysis that would invite comparative 
evaluations of procedural systems outside of the criminal arena.175 In the civil arena, 
such comparative evaluations are embedded in the doctrinal approach. For example, 
the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly articulated three factors to assess due process, the 
second of which involves a comparative assessment: (1) the litigant’s interest at 
stake; (2) the fairness of existing procedures and probable value of additional 
safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest at stake.176 This second factor permits 
a court to consider analogous systems of adjudication that are used to resolve similar 
disputes.177 The approach in Goldberg was momentarily applied to criminal cases in 
Ake v. Oklahoma, allowing a court to examine features of civil disputes to assist in 
determining the fairness of criminal procedures.178 But Ake was superseded by 
 
 
 174. Statutorily, disclosure obligations are triggered by the onset of trial in a number of 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-16-4 (2013); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 12(b), 16; WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 971.23 (West 2017). 
 175. 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992). 
 176. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). A balancing test permits broad discretion, providing opportunity 
for a court to weigh each factor differently or to omit different considerations within each 
factor. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (following Goldberg, 397 U.S. 
254); see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (criminal case following Mathews, 
424 U.S. 319). In In Re Winship, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden was compared to the 
“preponderance” standard applied in civil disputes. 397 U.S. 358, 370–71 (1970). 
 177. There are identical features between the civil, criminal, and administrative systems. 
Because of the similarities, these systems can be compared to measure additional safeguards. 
See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) (looking to criminal indigency determination in 
civil contempt proceedings); Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, No. 05-C-580, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29232 (E.D. Wisc. Mar. 31, 2007) (looking to civil discovery rules in an 
administrative hearing). 
 178. See Ake, 470 U.S. 68. Civil rules provide a functional, alternative mode of adjudication 
for comparison. Meyn, supra note 6, at 734. So much so, that rules of civil procedure were 
first proposed to govern criminal disputes. Id. Others acknowledge pretrial civil litigation 
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Medina, Justice Kennedy contending that criminal law was special, given what he 
observed to be its comprehensive treatment within the Constitution.179  
Pretrial civil procedure in particular is analogous to criminal disputes; common-
law tradition is an appropriate consideration in due process examinations,180 and 
before federal reform in the 1930s, civil and criminal pretrial procedure shared a 
similar structure.181 Should a civil to criminal comparison proceed, what would it 
potentially reveal? The adequacy of criminal procedures to develop and interrogate 
pretrial information would be tested against civil procedures, which for eighty years 
have followed a different trajectory.182 The length of this trajectory has significance 
to a due process review; entrenched norms can be understood to create minimum 
expectations of process.183 As in criminal litigation, the legislative process has 
defined what pretrial information is exchanged in civil disputes. No civil court has 
found that the civil pretrial discovery regime is constitutionally required. But the 
legislature in the civil arena created a different world with which it conceived of an 
alternative conception of what process is due184—thus providing substantial guidance 
as to the value of alternative procedures that are available to govern the exchange of 
pretrial information.  
What, for example, might transpire if a state legislature amended civil procedure 
to deprive civil litigants of discovery tools? Corporations’ and the plaintiffs’ bar 
would not go gently into the night. Civil litigants, under any reasonable scenario, 
would claim that pretrial discovery, legislatively granted for over eighty years in 
every state and federal jurisdiction in the United States, was so entrenched as to be 
fundamental—citing to the principles of transparency, notice, and deliberation that 
justified reform in the 1930s—and that its denial would offend due process. And if 
these civil litigants were correct that these embedded norms do define present notions 
of minimum due process (after all, wrote Justice O’Connor, due process was 
 
 
shares deep DNA with criminal litigation. Lynch, supra note 170, at 2120–21 (“[The] essential 
structure [of] a criminal case is nothing more than an ordinary [civil] lawsuit.”). 
 179. Medina, 505 U.S. at 443 (“In our view, the Mathews balancing test does not provide 
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“perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law—the least confined to history and the 
most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society”185), why 
would depriving criminal defendants of these same entitlements comport with due 
process where cases determine whether an individual should be incarcerated? Why 
would the lack of discovery in criminal litigation be adequate where discovery rights 
are essential to civil litigation and where the stakes for litigants are, at the least, 
commensurate? 
Under Medina, courts are on firm ground in avoiding the comparison to civil 
litigation that Goldberg would permit. Although Medina frees courts from engaging 
with analogous systems, courts still envision comparisons but resort to imaginary 
worlds. A common projection is a world governed by Brady; the other world is one 
that provides a defendant unfettered access to everything.186 In Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, for example, the Court stated, “[a] defendant’s right to discover exculpatory 
evidence does not include the unsupervised authority to search through the 
Commonwealth’s files.”187 In Moore v. Illinois, the Court stated there is “no 
constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed 
accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case.”188 Courts make 
these sweeping statements as they ignore what occurs across the hall, where civil 
litigants exchange information according to a rule-bound process superintended by 
opposing counsel and ultimately the judge. Other slippery slope scenarios find 
expression in the criminal arena. Some courts, for example, maintain that transferring 
the role of supervising Brady from the prosecutor to a judge would be “extremely 
time-consuming” for judges who are “too busy,” with little benefit in terms of 
compliance.189 This view again ignores the functional, party-driven discovery regime 
in civil litigation, which is ultimately refereed by a (however busy) trial court. 
In a few instances, litigants have asked courts to consider importing rules over the 
criminal/civil divide. In United States v. Sierra Pacific Industries, a civil case, the 
defendant sought post-conviction relief under Brady.190 The court rejected the 
attempt, stating that the due process interest of a civil defendant paled in comparison 
to a criminal defendant.191 Yet, the court’s analysis belied its conclusion, finding the 
civil defendant was protected by existing civil pretrial procedures (that exceeded 
Brady’s requirements): “The expansive right to discovery in civil cases and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . provided [the civil] defendants with 
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 191. Id. at 957 (“The ‘requirement of due process . . . in safeguarding the liberty of the 
citizen against deprivation through the action of the State, embodies the fundamental 
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.’” (quoting 
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935))). 
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constitutionally adequate process to mount an effective and meaningful defense to 
this civil action.”192 One is left wondering: if the pretrial civil rules provide a 
constitutionally adequate procedure to mount an effective defense, is it really 
possible that the absence of such rules in criminal litigation is constitutionally 
adequate? In Sierra Pacific, the court breezily credits the value that an opportunity 
to develop a pretrial record has to a litigant at trial; but, in the criminal context, courts 
pretend this obvious connection does not exist and instead imbue trial with a 
talismanic, error-cleansing, fact-developing status.  
How can a constitutionally less-protected civil defendant be entitled to more 
pretrial information, and the criminal defendant, who is entitled to greater 
constitutional protection, be entitled to less pretrial information? This paradox is in 
part given legitimacy by the popular view of Brady, which imagines an idealized 
version of trial: should a criminal defendant elect to advance to trial, he avails himself 
of the panoply of powerful rights that the Constitution affords (but this is really no 
different than a trial in a civil case).193 This persistent fiction (rejected by civil 
procedure scholars)194 that trial somehow substitutes for pretrial interrogation of the 
record permits the Brady doctrine’s legitimacy. And yet the Brady doctrine punches 
well above its weight, broadcasting a perception of burden that well exceeds its actual 
requirements of the prosecutor. 
The faulty premise that pretrial proceedings do not significantly influence trials 
was rebutted during the reform to civil procedure, thirty years before the Court 
decided Brady.195 Reformers to civil procedure viewed the trial as a continuation of 
pretrial proceedings and believed that adopting a pretrial discovery phase profoundly 
informed the quality and nature of any subsequent trial. Civil reformers 
acknowledged that pretrial preparation is essential to fair settlements and fair trials; 
the pretrial interrogation of claims and defenses is actually the function of the 
adversarial system. Yet the Court, itself integral to the creation of the civil procedure 
template, has continued to maintain that, in criminal disputes, trial exists in a vacuum. 
A due process doctrine that credited what is obvious—pretrial discovery’s essential 
role to an adversary process’s operation—would compare the prosecutor’s unilateral 
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control over the pretrial record to the due process entitlements (and maybe rights) 
that are currently granted to civil defendants.  
B. Can the Prosecutor Be a Judge in Her Own Case? 
A related, narrower due process question emerges: what degree of decision-
making power in litigation should one party be permitted to the exclusion of the other 
party? At common law, the trial court as gatekeeper could require the prosecutor to 
describe factual allegations to the court’s satisfaction. After federal reform to 
criminal procedure in 1946,196 the power to determine the sufficiency of the pretrial 
factual record was transferred from the judiciary to the executive. Importation of 
notice pleading to criminal disputes removed the trial court’s pretrial role and 
conferred unprecedented control over the pretrial record to the prosecutor, providing 
significantly less notice, transparency, and deliberation during the pretrial phase than 
the civil system. As a result, power over the pretrial record, as well as over pretrial 
dynamics, was transferred from the judge to the prosecutor, from the judiciary to the 
executive, and from a neutral adjudicator to one party to a dispute.197  
Brady legitimized this pretrial transfer of power from the judiciary to the 
executive through its subsilencio validation of this procedural design. Professor John 
Orth observed a fundamental tenant of due process prohibits any law that makes one 
“[j]udge and party.”198 Did the 1946 federal reform to criminal procedure do just 
that? The question of whether a person can be a judge in her own case tests, as John 
Orth writes, “the procedural fairness of any legal system by highlighting one of its 
most essential features, whether cases are decided by an independent decision 
maker.”199 Even Judge Gerard Lynch, who views the prosecutor’s increasing control 
over the disposition of criminal cases as an “innovation” that absorbs inquisitorial 
features to permit system-wide efficiency,200 wondered whether the arrangement 
constituted a “perversion of the classic due process model.”201 
The response to this question is that a prosecutor’s “minister-of-justice” 
obligation mitigates due process concerns. In this role, prosecutors are charged with 
 
 
 196. See FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, WITH NOTES PREPARED AND 
PROCEEDINGS (Alexander Holtzoff, ed. 1946). 
 197. Where a judge does still intervene, it has no application to the determination of witness 
credibility and other critical issues to litigation. As to presiding over motions to suppress, filing 
rates are low, rates of success even lower. See, e.g., Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the 
Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 595 
(conducting a tristate study (Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania) of 7767 felony cases: defendants 
filed motions to suppress in eleven percent of cases with success in seventy cases).  
 198. JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 15 (2003). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Lynch’s assessment that the consolidation of prosecutorial power was necessary to 
attend to the growing docket of criminal cases and to meet a crime wave that came on the tail 
end of the tough-on-crime hysteria, which would soon give way to collective reassessment. A 
fair number of scholars now contend that the consolidation of prosecutorial power achieved 
more prosecutions independent of when the crime rate rose or fell and was thus a key 
contributor to the crisis of mass incarceration. See generally JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE 
TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 206 (2017). 
 201. Lynch, supra note 170, at 2121. 
920 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:883 
 
stepping “out of their purely adversarial roles . . . [to] ensure justice is done.”202 
Where actors typically answer to a neutral party for allegations of misfeasance, 
prosecutors answer to self-reflection, sometimes internal review.203 Brady subscribes 
to this view, implicitly holding that entrusting the distribution of any pretrial 
information to one party somehow comports with due process. The minister-of-
justice role promotes internal prosecutorial review of issues that occur on legal and 
ethical margins—those exact situations that a neutral party should step in as a 
referee.204 The minister-of-justice role is suspiciously embraced by those burdened 
by it. But what purpose does a judge serve if a “minister of justice” oversees 
proceedings? To argue that the classic due process model is satisfied if proceedings 
are overseen by a judge that has a stake in the litigation is to normalize the very 
circumstances that would require, of an actual judge, recusal. 
The procedural design of criminal litigation was not inevitable. The initial draft 
of federal criminal procedure mirrored the civil-procedure template.205 Had this 
version become law, it would have plainly influenced how lawyers, scholars, and 
courts conceived of due process.206 But, this version was rejected. As a result, pretrial 
design provides criminal defendants with rights that are far inferior to civil litigants. 
This state of litigation became the new normal and in turn shaped conceptions of due 
process.207 
CONCLUSION 
“No government official in America has as much unreviewable power and 
discretion as the prosecutor,” wrote Stephanos Bibas.208 Brady might be viewed as a 
building block of that story. Brady arguably served to bestow constitutional 
validation to a national reform effort that afforded pretrial agency to a civil 
defendant, but not a criminal defendant. The implicit compromise struck in Brady—
to impose a minor burden on the prosecutor at trial but to shield a prosecutor’s use 
 
 
 202. Bennett L. Gershman, The Zealous Prosecutor as Minister of Justice, 48 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 151, 155 (2011). 
 203. For a thorough treatment of the prosecutor’s unreviewed decisions at multiple (and 
critical) junctures along the litigation timeline, see DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION 
COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012). 
 204. Epps, supra note 172, at 846–47.  
 205. But the possibility of this alternative reality was undermined by a Criminal Committee 
controlled by prosecutorial interests. See Meyn, supra note 6 at 708; supra text accompanying 
notes 45–50.  
 206. If something like Brady had still emerged, its role would be understood for what it 
actually is, a right that provides a post-conviction remedy unique to criminal litigation that 
guarantees material, exculpatory information is provided to defendant at the onset of trial. 
 207. See Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. 
L. REV. 48, 48–49 (2000). One theory of constitutional review is that the Court is not so much 
a countermajoritarian institution; instead, it tends to divine the majority’s true self—as 
Matthew Lassiter portrays the theory, the Court acts in a way “more democratic than the 
legislative choices of elected representatives.” Matthew D. Lassiter, Does the Supreme Court 
Matter? Civil Rights and the Inherent Politicization of Constitutional Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
1401, 1405–06 (2005). 
 208. Bibas, supra note 58, at 960. 
2020] FLIPPING THE SCRIPT ON BRADY 921 
 
of pretrial information from constitutional scrutiny—contributed to the expansion of 
prosecutorial influence. And yet, outcomes are given legitimacy that in part flow 
from the narrative that Brady imposes a significant burden on the prosecutor. And 
despite the Court’s stating that the doctrine has no bearing on the pretrial moment, 
the DOJ has effectively wielded Brady to defeat legislative proposals to expand 
pretrial discovery. This Article asks, in addition to the prosecutorial burden narrative, 
might Brady also be fairly represented as a prosecutorial ally.  
A consensus is growing that criminal-justice conditions are unacceptable and that 
blame for these conditions is partially attributable to the prosecutorial role.209 To 
view Brady as a prosecutorial ally and a threat to adversarial balance invites a 
reassessment of entrenched due process norms, providing an opportunity to have 
meaningful discussions on reforming how criminal disputes are resolved. 
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